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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan as a Commercial Speech Case 
 
More than two decades after categorically denying protection for commercial 
speech,1 the United States Supreme Court opened the door to First Amendment 
protection in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan when it held that a paid political 
advertisement was fully protected speech.2  Shortly thereafter, in the mid-1970s, 
with its rulings in Bigelow v. Virginia3 and Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council,4 the Court began to develop a commercial speech 
doctrine that afforded limited protection to commercial speech.  Then in 1980, with 
Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New 
York,5 the Court introduced an intermediate level test which was used to balance the 
regulatory interests of the State against the First Amendment rights of commercial 
speakers.6   
 
1See Valentine v. Chrestensen 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
 
2 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 
3 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
 
4 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 
5 447 U.S. 557 (1980).   
 
6 See Susan Dente Ross, Reconstructing First Amendment Doctrine: the 1990s Revolution of the 
Central Hudson and O’Brien Tests, 23 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 723 (2001).  Ross provides a 
succinct breakdown of the different levels of scrutiny in the constitutional analysis of laws regulating 
speech:  “The United States Supreme Court has adopted a three-tiered approach to constitutional 
analysis whereby the Court increases its scrutiny of laws as their infringement upon fundamental rights 
increases.  Laws that directly limit fundamental constitutional rights are subject to strict scrutiny and 
must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest.  In First Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Court has applied strict scrutiny to content-based laws that discriminate on the basis 
of viewpoint or content.  Content-neutral laws, which present a reduced risk of illicit government 
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For more than a decade after Central Hudson, the Court generally applied this 
test to all commercial speech cases that came before it.  It became apparent during 
this time that commercial speech was, as one critic put it, “the stepchild of First 
Amendment jurisprudence.”7 Some wondered if the Central Hudson test provided a 
meaningful check on commercial speech regulations at all.8  However, the latter 
half of the 1990s saw the Court reshape the Central Hudson test and thereby 
increase First Amendment protection for commercial speech.  At key points in the 
doctrine’s development, in particular when the Court initiated First Amendment 
protection and then when it strengthened that protection in the 1990s, the First 
Amendment philosophy of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan provided the Court with 
a guiding rationale for protecting commercial speech.   
Although Sullivan is mostly remembered for revolutionizing libel law, its 
impact on the commercial speech doctrine is noteworthy.  Consider a recent case9 
the Court dismissed in 2003 that, like Sullivan, involved the intersection of 
commercial and speech on matters of public interest.  The case involved a suit 
brought by California resident Marc Kasky against Nike, Inc. for unfair and 
 
motives to suppress specific ideas, face intermediate scrutiny, a type of constrained balancing test.  
Laws of general application that impose the most minor intrusions on speech are exposed to the 
minimal scrutiny of rational review” at 726-727. 
 
7 See Nicholas P. Consula, The First Amendment, Gaming Advertisements, and Congressional 
Inconsistency: The Future of the Commercial Speech Doctrine after Greater New Orleans 
Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States, 28 Pepp. L. Rev. 353 (2001) at 353. 
 
8 See, e.g., Michael Hoefges and Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, “Vice” Advertising under the Supreme 
Court’s Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Shifting Central Hudson Analysis, 22 Hastings Comm. & 
Ent. L.J. 345 (2000). 
 
9 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003). 
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deceptive practices that he argued violated California’s Unfair Competition Law 
and False Advertising Law.  Kasky accused Nike of making false and misleading 
claims in a public relations campaign aimed at countering allegations of worker 
mistreatment in the shoe and clothing manufacturer’s foreign factories.10  Nike 
argued, invoking Sullivan, that because its PR campaign addressed matters of public 
interest it should receive full First Amendment protection.11  Although the lower 
courts agreed with Nike, the California Supreme Court held that Nike’s PR 
campaign messages were commercial speech.12
For some scholars the Nike case illustrates the failings of the commercial speech 
doctrine.  By allowing less protection for commercial speech and by failing to 
clearly establish what constitutes commercial speech, too much discretion has been 
left to the lower courts, leading to inconsistent rulings.13  For others,14 one of the 
central questions presented by the Nike case is will corporations, using the Sullivan 
argument, be able to “immunize false or misleading product information” by 
 
10 Id. at 656. 
 
11 See generally Robert L. Kerr, From Sullivan to Nike: Will the Noble Purpose of the Landmark 
Speech Case Be Subverted to Immunize False Advertising? 9 Comm. L. & Pol’y 525 (2004) (arguing 
that this could potentially immunize any false or misleading statements.  In Sullivan, the Court said the 
“erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and …it must be protected if the freedoms of 
expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they need to survive” 376 U.S. 254 (1964) at 272).  
  
12 539 U.S. 654 (2003) at 657 (quoting the California Supreme Court as saying that “‘[b]ecause the 
messages in question were directed by a commercial speaker to a commercial audience, and because 
they made representations of fact about the speakers own business operations for the purpose of 
promoting sales of its products, …[the] messages are commercial speech’”). 
 
13 See, e.g., William Warner Eldridge IV, Just Do It: Kasky v. Nike, Inc Illustrates That it is Time to 
Abandon the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 12 Geo. Mason. L. Rev. 179 (2003). 
 
14 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 11. 
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including a public issue with its commercial message? 15  Some scholars think this 
is a possibility.16  After all, the California Court of Appeals ruled that Nike’s 
statements were “‘part of a public dialogue on a matter of public concern within the 
core expression protected by the First Amendment.’”17  Statements such as these 
evince the continuing influence of Sullivan on the ever-evolving commercial speech 
doctrine. 
As a commercial speech case, Sullivan marks the beginning of the end of the 
Court’s categorical refusal of protection for commercial speech.  And, as we have 
seen, the legacy of Sullivan has important implications in the current debate.  The 
recent attention given to Sullivan as a commercial speech case by both scholars18 
and in the courts warrants a closer look at the decision with an eye to its historical 
underpinnings and ideological assumptions.   
The text of Sullivan provides a good opportunity for this type of investigation.  
In the opinion, Justice Brennan wrote that the Court’s decision was “compelled by 
neither precedent nor policy.”19  The Court focused more on the lessons of history 
and on what they believed to be the “central purpose and meaning of the First 
 
15 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) at 68.  
 
16 See Kerr, supra note 11. 
 
17 539 U.S. 654 at 657 (Stevens, J. concurring). 
 
18 See Susan Dente Ross and R. Kenton Bird, The Ad That Changed Libel Law:  Judicial Realism and 
Social Activism in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,  9 Comm. L. & Pol’y 489 (2004); See also Kerr, 
supra note 11. 
 
19 376 U.S. 254 (1964) at 269. 
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Amendment” to justify their decision.20  For this reason, Sullivan presents a unique 
opportunity to develop, trace and evaluate a First Amendment philosophy that could 
be used to inform the current discussion on the commercial speech doctrine. 
Therefore the following research questions were proposed.  If the text of 
Sullivan relies on neither precedent nor policy, what are the historical justifications 
and First Amendment principles used to arrive at the decision?  Does the Court’s 
opinion present a coherent First Amendment philosophy?  And, if so, what impact, 
if any, has this philosophy had on the commercial speech doctrine? 
This paper shows that it is indeed possible to delineate a coherent First 
Amendment philosophy from the text of Sullivan.  In that opinion, there are two 
First Amendment values underlying the Court’s rationale:  the search for truth and 
democratic self-governance.  The First Amendment philosophy of Sullivan can be 
seen as a synthesis of these two values.  The search for truth or the marketplace of 
ideas theory of free speech assumes that truth or correct opinion is best achieved in 
an environment in which multiple and competing viewpoints, opinions and ideas 
are interchanged freely.  In the opinion, this libertarian view of speech is tempered 
by democratic self-governance theory, which the Court locates in lessons of history, 
namely the debate surrounding the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.  Self-
governance theory is grounded in the idea that freedom of expression is necessary 
for the operation of a democratic form of government.  On the whole, the First 
Amendment philosophy of Sullivan views speech as valuable insofar as it educates 
 
20 See Ross and Bird, supra note 18, at 507. 
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and informs the decision-making public; that speech that serves this interest, what 
the Sullivan Court called speech on matters of public interest, should enjoy free, 
uninhibited entry into the public arena. 
This paper then argues that the rationale of Sullivan can be seen at work at key 
points in the development of the commercial speech doctrine.  Commercial speech 
was introduced under the aegis of the First Amendment because the Court 
concluded that the free flow of commercial information was vital to the decision-
making public and therefore warranted First Amendment protection.  Although the 
Court strayed from this rationale when it introduced the Central Hudson balancing 
test, it returned to it in the 1990s when it strengthened First Amendment protection 
for commercial speech.  This paper argues then, that the founding rationale of the 
commercial speech doctrine can be traced to the philosophy of Sullivan and that 
when the Court follows this rationale, commercial speech is provided with 
significant protection. 
  7
                                                
CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
This project begins with basic legal research.  Most legal research relies on a 
relatively uniform methodology.  Simply put, legal research begins with the 
presentation of a hypothesis or a legal question.  It then discusses the relevant case 
law and provides a conclusion that typically argues for a particular approach to the 
legal area under investigation.  Legal research can investigate both primary and 
secondary source material.  Primary source material includes “Constitutional 
provisions, statutes, court opinions, and administrative regulations.”21  Secondary 
source material is commentary on or analysis of the law.22  The primary source 
materials for the present project are the relevant federal and state court decisions.  
The secondary source materials include law review articles and legal treatises.  The 
source materials were gathered primarily from the Lexis / Nexis database. 
 
21 See Amy E. Sloan, Basic Legal Research: Tools and Strategies, 2nd Edition (2003) at 4. 
 
22 Id. at 4. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
Almost from its inception, the commercial speech doctrine has been the 
object of widespread academic criticism.23  In addition, much scholarly work 
has examined the level of constitutional protection that should be afforded 
commercial speech and the viability of this type of speech as a protected class.24  
Scholars have debated the distinction between commercial and other types of 
protected speech and the possibility or impossibility of maintaining such a 
distinction.25  And other studies have focused on the social and judicial climate 
surrounding decisions that have impacted the doctrine.26
 
23 See, e.g., Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1,2 
(2000) (characterizing the doctrine as “unstable and contentious”); Steven Shiffrin, The First 
Amendment and Economic Regulation:  Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. 
U.L. Rev. 1212, 1212-16 (1983) (asserting that the commercial speech doctrine is fraught with various 
problems and conceptual difficulties).   Criticism grew more intense with the adoption of the Central 
Hudson test, with critics asserting that the Court complicated the commercial speech doctrine by 
creating a test that lower courts would have difficulty following.  See, e.g., Alex Kozinski and Stuart 
Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 Va. L. Rev. 627,632 (1990); Ronald A. Cass, 
Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism and Collective Choice, 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1317, 1374-75 
(1988); Matthew L. Miller, Note, The First Amendment and Legislative Bans of Liquor and Cigarette 
Advertisements, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 632, 633-635 (1985); Brian Waters, Comment, A Doctrine in 
Disarray: Why the First Amendment Demands the Abandonment of the Central Hudson Commercial 
Speech Test, 27 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1626, 1628 (1997); Jonathan Weinberg, Note, Constitutional 
Protection of Commercial Speech, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 720, 730 (1982). 
 
24 See, e.g.,  Martin Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the 
Values of Free Expression, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 420, 429 (1971); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Too 
Much Puff: Persuasion, Paternalism and Commercial Speech, 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1205 (1988); 
Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 449 (1985); 
S. Prakash Sethi, Advocacy Advertising and Large Corporations (1977); Bruce Ledewitz, Corporate 
Advertising’s Democracy, 12 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 389 (2003); Kerr, supra note 11; Eldridge IV, supra 
note 13; Consula, supra note 7. 
 
25 See, e.g., Elizabeth Blanks Hindman, The Chickens Have Come Home to Roost:  Individualism, 
Collectivism and Conflict in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 9 Comm. L.  Pol’y 237 (2004); David A. J. 
Richards, A New Paradigm for Free Speech Scholarship, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 271, 279-84 (1990); 
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One example of the historical approach is Kozinski and Banner.27 The 
authors investigate the historical and cultural circumstances surrounding the 
1942 case Valentine v. Chrestensen28—the case recognized by scholars as the 
beginning of the commercial speech doctrine.  The authors examine the legal 
developments and changes in the advertising industry in the early stages of the 
doctrine’s development.  They suggest that the current and hotly debated 
distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech was born during 
this period.  The authors conclude that the commercial speech doctrine might 
look quite different had its inception followed the 1964 case New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan29 than when it did.  Before Sullivan, the Court did not even 
consider the question of commercial speech insofar as advertising was 
 
Kozinski and Banner, supra note 23; Scott Wellikoff, Mixed Speech: Inequities that Result From an 
Ambiguous Doctrine, 19 St. John’s J.L. Comm. 159 (2004); Erwin Chemerinsky and Catherine Fisk, 
What is Commercial Speech?  The Issue Not Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 Case W. Res. 1143 (2004); 
David Hoch and Robert Franz, Eco-Porn Versus the Constitution: Commercial Speech and the 
Regulation of Environmental Advertising, 58 Alb. L. Rev. 441, 461 (1994); Bob D. Cutler and Darrel 
D. Muehling, Advocacy Advertising and the Boundaries of Commercial Speech, Journal of 
Advertising, Vol. 18 No. 3, 40 (1989); Kent R. Middleton, Advocacy Advertising, the First 
Amendment, and Competitive Advantage: A Comment on Cutler & Muehling, Journal of Advertising, 
Vol. 20, No.2, 77 (1991). 
 
26 See, e.g., Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial 
Speech, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 747 (1993); Soontae An, From a Business Pursuit to a Means of Expression: 
The Supreme Court’s Disputes Over Commercial Speech from 1942 to 1976, 8 Comm. L. & Pol’y 201 
(2003). 
 
27 See generally Kozinski and Banner, supra note 26. 
 
28 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
 
29 367 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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considered a business act not a speech act.  Thus, the Court was more interested 
in the regulation of commerce than the regulation of speech.30
An continues with this type of historical inquiry by exploring the slow and 
gradual evolution of the commercial speech doctrine between Valentine and the 
Court’s decision to grant some level of First Amendment protection in 1976. 31  
An argues that the Court’s rulings during the period leading up to Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council 32 reflected general 
social and cultural attitudes toward advertising; as advertising began to be seen 
in a more positive light, by both government and society, the Court increasingly 
softened its earlier stance against commercial speech.33
The level of protection that should be accorded commercial expression has 
been hotly debated throughout the evolution of the commercial speech doctrine.  
Even before it came under the umbrella of the First Amendment in 1976, legal 
scholar Martin Redish was arguing for constitutional protection.34  This was 
countered by several scholars35 including Sethi who feared that First 
Amendment protection for commercial speech presented the “danger of 
 
30 See generally Kozinski and Banner, supra note 26. 
 
31 See generally An, supra note 26. 
 
32 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 
33 See An, supra note 26, at 201. 
 
34 See generally Redish, supra note 24.  
 
35 See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 24; Blasi, supra note 24. 
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squeezing out alternative viewpoints from the public communication space and 
thereby impairing public access to information.”36   
The debate continues.  Ledewitz, for example, argues that any speech 
protection for advertisers is a serious threat to democracy.37  In his view, the 
culture of advertising conditions people to become consumers and treats 
corporations as persons. 38 Such a culture is fostered by what he calls “corporate 
advertising’s democracy” and is a serious threat to political life.39  Kerr also 
argues against extending full protection to commercial speech, citing potentially 
disastrous social consequences.40  At the other end of the spectrum, Eldridge 
argues that denying commercial speech full protection encourages “overly broad 
statutes [that] risk restricting speech that is not necessarily commercial.”41   
This debate seems to hinge on the distinction or lack of distinction between 
commercial and non-commercial speech.  There is some consensus among 
scholars that the present doctrine lacks bright lines in this area.  Hindman, for 
example, characterizes the evolution of the commercial speech doctrine as an 
era of confusion brought on by the Court’s vacillation between collectivist and 
 
36 See Sethi, supra note 24, at 4. 
 
37 See Ledewitz, supra note 24, at 391. 
 
38 Id. at 400. 
 
39 Id. 
 
40 See Kerr, supra note 11, at 560 (responding to questions raised by Nike v. Kasky, the author asks the 
reader to “consider the inestimable societal cost represented by the nightmare scenario of a consumer 
market in which any false/misleading-speech regulation at all could be evaded merely by linking 
commercial messages to an issue of public interest”). 
 
41 See Eldridge IV, supra note 13, at 207. 
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individualist approaches to First Amendment jurisprudence.42  In some cases 
such as Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co,43 the Court took the 
collectivist approach, hoping to protect consumers from potentially harmful 
advertising messages.44  At other times, the Court attempted to protect the rights 
of individuals to receive information in order to make rational choices, the 
individualist approach.45  In trying to “carve a path between” these two 
ideologies, the Court has created a confusing and ambiguous doctrine.46   
In calling for full First Amendment protection for commercial speech, 
Hindman seems to suggest that speech is speech no matter the origin or the 
intent.  In a similar vein, Kozinski and Banner argue for abandoning the legal 
distinction and adopting the O’Brien test to determine the constitutionality of 
government regulations on commercial speech.47  As we have seen, these 
arguments are based on the difficulty of drawing distinct lines between 
commercial and noncommercial speech.  As one scholar observes, new modes 
 
42 See Hindman, supra note 25, at 237. 
 
43 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
 
44 See Hindman, supra note 25, at 249. 
 
45 Id. at 249. 
 
46 Id. at 237. 
 
47 See Kozinski and Banner, supra note 23, at 651.  (writing that under this standard content-neutral 
analysis, “[g]overnment regulation is constitutional where it furthers an important governmental 
interest, the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the restriction 
on expression is no greater than necessary”).  See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367,377 (1968). 
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of expression have made the line “so blurry as to be indistinguishable.”48  The 
result is a commercial speech doctrine that cannot adequately categorize the 
various modes of expression used by corporate and non-corporate speakers 
alike.49  Yet, however difficult line drawing may be, for some scholars, this is 
no “reason to abandon the effort altogether.”50
Other scholars maintain that there is indeed a distinction between 
commercial and non-commercial speech,51 even if definitional questions still 
surround the issue.52  Cutler and Muehling argue that the distinction can be 
determined by the “competitive impact” of the speech; that if an ad benefits the 
sponsor it should be considered commercial speech and if it benefits society, 
political speech.53  By contrast, Middleton argues that this approach fails to 
properly distinguish between the two types of speech and might even “permit 
undue regulation of fully protected expression.”54  Richards argues for a 
distinction on the basis that the First Amendment protects “the spontaneous and 
automatic expression of sincere, moral, social, or political conviction” and that 
 
48 See Deborah J. La Freta, Kick It Up A Notch: First Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech, 
54 Case W. Res. 1205 (2004) at 1207. 
 
49 Id. at 1207. 
 
50 See Chemerinsky and Fisk, supra note 25, at 1160. 
 
51 See, e.g., Hoch and Franz, supra note 25. 
 
52 See Edward J. McAndrew, City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.: Elevating the Value of 
Commercial Speech?, 43 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1247, 1248 (1994).  The Court is aware of these definitional 
problems and subsequently has had to rely in some cases solely on a “common-sense” distinction.  See, 
e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
 
53 See generally Cutler and Muehling, supra note 25. 
 
54 See Middleton, supra note 25, at 78. 
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this is lacking in commercial speech.55  This suggests that commercial speech is 
inherently different from other forms of protected speech.  However, Wellikoff 
points to cases such as Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.56 that undermine 
this assumed distinction and add to the “endless confusion in classifying speech 
as commercial.”57
The effect this ambiguous doctrine has had on lower courts is exemplified 
by Nike v. Kasky in which the California Supreme Court disagreed with two 
lower courts over the definition of commercial speech.58  It has also been 
argued that the current commercial speech doctrine gives non-commercial 
speech an unfair advantage in public debate.59  Nike’s critics, for example, were 
able to publicize allegations against Nike using fully protected speech.  Yet 
when Nike responded, its speech was subject to regulation as commercial 
speech.60  For opponents of the commercial speech doctrine, this inherent 
unfairness calls for abandoning the distinction altogether.61
One such opponent, Terilli, argues that the current commercial speech 
doctrine is unacceptable insofar as it unnecessarily chills speech by so-called 
 
55 See generally Richards, supra note 25. 
 
56 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
 
57 See Wellikoff, surpa note 25, at 177.  
 
58 See Eldridge IV, supra note 13, at 192. 
 
59 See Wellikoff, supra note 25, at 189; see also Eldridge, supra note 13. 
 
60 See Wellikoff, supra note 25, at 192. 
 
61 Id.  
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commercial speakers. 62  As Nike v. Kasky evinces, the doctrine has the effect of 
constricting public debate.63 Terilli argues that “a commitment to wide-open 
and robust debate is a limited commitment if it is subject to an exception based 
on the poorly defined and broad commercial speech category.”64  Terilli argues, 
along with Kozinski and Banner,65 that granting full First Amendment 
protection to commercial speech does not necessarily put it out of the reach of 
government regulation.  This position is supported by the relevant case law.66  
The basis for the regulation of advertising and public relations practices 
would be the government’s power to regulate food, drugs, 
intimidating conduct, land use, employment, discrimination, 
sales and similar matters—and not any regulation of speech.67
 
For some, even if there were a clear cut distinction between commercial and 
non-commercial speech, commercial speech should still receive full protection.  
These critics argue that corporate and commercial speech are just as valuable as 
political speech in American democratic life.  La Freta argues that corporations 
play a vital role in the American political economy and this imbues corporate 
speech “with inherent value.”68  In addition, corporate speech potentially could 
 
62 See Samuel A. Terilli, Nike v. Kasky and the Running-But-Going-Nowhere Commercial Speech 
Debate, Comm. L. & Pol’y, 10 (4), 383-432 (2004). 
 
63 Id. at 424. 
 
64 Id. at 424. 
 
65 See generally  Kozinski and Banner, supra note 23. 
 
66 See Terilli, supra note 62, at 426. 
 
67 Id.  
 
68 Id. at 1207. 
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provide opinions otherwise left unexpressed in the marketplace of ideas.69  In a 
similar vein, Consula looks at the social and economic context of American 
culture to determine that commercial speech should be accorded full First 
Amendment protection.70  He argues that in the free market economy, the right 
to provide information to consumers might be even more important than 
political, religious or artistic expression.71  The U.S. is an economic as well as a 
social and political institution; the free market economy relies on the free flow 
of all information so consumers can make well informed decisions in the 
economic marketplace as well as the marketplace of ideas.72  Despite this, 
Consula does not see the current Court abolishing the commercial speech 
doctrine anytime soon.73  Yet, according to Langvardt, greater protection for 
commercial speech within the boundaries of the current doctrine seems right on 
the horizon.74
Some scholars have argued that in the 1990s the Court’s rationale for 
protecting commercial speech seems to have shifted its emphasis away from the 
 
 
69 Id. at 1207. 
 
70 See, generally Consula, supra note 7. 
 
71 Id. at 379; see also Kozinski and Banner supra note 23, at 652 (writing that “in a free market 
economy, the ability to give and receive information about commercial matters may be as important, 
sometimes more important, than expression of a political, artistic, or religious nature”). 
 
72 See Consula, supra note 7, at 379. 
 
73 Id. at 379. 
 
74 See generally Arlen Langvardt, The Incremental Strengthening of First Amendment Protection for 
Commercial Speech: Lessons from Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 37 Am. Bus. L. J. 587 (2000). 
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listener’s right to a “concern for the expressive rights of the speaker.”75  This 
has resulted in a ratcheting up of protection for commercial speech.  Indeed, as 
Ross argues, the increased rigor of the Court’s “review of laws affecting 
commercial speech” has coincided with the reduced “rigor of its review of laws 
affecting the media.”76  Alarmingly, the author believes that this has resulted in 
a hierarchical shift where commercial speech has become more protected than 
other types of protected speech.77  In a similar vein, Hoefges and Rivera-
Sanchez show that protection for commercial speech has been enhanced by a 
string of cases—Rubin v. Coors,78 44 Liqourmart v. Rhode Island79 and Greater 
New Orleans Broadcasting  v. U.S.80—involving “vice” advertising 81  Yet 
despite this increased protection, “the one thing that ties together all of the 
 
75 See David C. Vladeck, Lessons From A Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 Case W. Res. 
1049 (2004) at 1072; See also Rodney A. Smolla, Free the Fortune 500!  The Debate Over Corporate 
Speech and the First Amendment, 54 Case W. Res. 1277 (2004) at 1297. 
 
76 See Ross, supra note 6, at 726. 
 
77 Id. at 726. 
 
78 514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
 
79 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996). 
 
80 527 U.S. 173 (1999). 
 
81 See Hoefges and Rivera-Sanchez, supra note 8, at 387-388 (arguing that these cases effectively 
reversed earlier decisions in Posadas and Edge and extended protection to vice advertising.  The 
authors also show that four current Justices—Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg and Thomas—“have 
expressed their support for abandoning intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson analysis when 
government restricts truthful, non-deceptive advertising in order to manipulate lawful consumers 
choices in the marketplace”). 
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Court’s commercial speech cases […] is the Court’s hostility to false 
commercial speech.”82   
For proponents of the commercial speech doctrine, such as Chemerinsky 
and Fisk, this is good news.  In their view, commercial speech will not function 
in the marketplace of ideas like other protected speech;83 the entire premise of 
the commercial speech doctrine is “the Court’s longstanding belief that the truth 
about a company’s products and facilities will not emerge if the seller can lie 
about it.”84  Consumers simply lack access to company facilities and they lack 
the time to investigate the truth about the hundreds of commercial messages 
they are confronted with on any given day.85  On the other hand, some scholars 
question whether it’s the government’s responsibility to vet the truth of 
commercial statements.86  Instead they argue that this is the responsibility of the 
free press.87
For Johnson and Fisher this is exactly what happened in the Nike case—
Nike’s statements, because they were met with vehement counter-argument, did 
not survive that test of the marketplace of ideas.88  In other words, the 
 
82 See Vladeck, supra note 75, at 1074. 
 
83 See Chemerinsky and Fisk, supra note 25, at 1132. 
 
84 Id. at 1153. 
 
85 Id. at 1153. 
 
86 See generally Bruce E. H. Johnson and Jeffrey L. Fisher, Why Format, Not Content, Is the Key to 
Identifying Commercial Speech, 54 Case W. Res. 1243 (2004). 
 
87 Id.  
 
88 Id. 
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marketplace sorted the lies from the truth.  This suggests that media response to 
false statements made by corporations is sufficient to keep the public safe from 
those false statements.89  There is no need to level the playing field through 
corporate censorship; for example, in the Nike case, it was already evened out 
by the more than 15,000 news articles and opinion columns written about 
Nike’s labor practices. 90  Rather than create a “constitutional imbalance” by 
censoring one side of the debate, Collins and Skover argue that we need more 
protection for the citizen critic.91
Almost completely absent from the literature on the commercial speech 
doctrine is any prolonged discussion of the role of Sullivan.  There are, 
however, two noteworthy exceptions.  In one, Kerr argues that Nike v. Kasky 
brings to the fore a question that has been mostly left undecided by the current 
doctrine:  what level of protection should be accorded commercial speech that 
addresses matters of public debate?92  Kerr points out that Sullivan opened the 
door to First Amendment protection for commercial speech at the same time 
that it established the fullest level of protection for “debate on public issues.”93  
 
 
89 Id. at 1254 (writing that “the very press coverage of Nike that forms the backdrop of the Kasky case 
demonstrates that the media serves as an effective watchdog over corporate press releases and more 
than adequately counterbalances companies’ assertions regarding controversial business practices”). 
 
90 See Ronald K. L. Collins and David M. Skover, The Landmark Free Speech Case That Wasn’t: The 
Nike v. Kasky Story, 54 Case W. Res. 965 (2004) at 1045.  
 
91 Id. at 1045 (arguing that what is needed is not censorship but greater free speech protections in order 
to keep the debate in the court of public opinion and out of the trial courts). 
 
92 See Kerr, supra note 11. 
 
93 Id. at 526. 
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Nike v. Kasky, like Sullivan, involves the intersection of these two types of 
speech.  Kerr writes, the  
question at the heart of the Nike case derives from the crossroads 
of those two Sullivan legacies:  When speech potentially 
implicates both commercial speech doctrine and the political 
speech doctrine, how should speech be assessed in terms of First 
Amendment protection?94
   
For Kerr, the answer can be found in what he calls Sullivan’s noble purpose—
“protecting people from concentrations of power.”95
Ross and Bird take a different approach to Sullivan, but still consider it as an 
important commercial speech case.96  The author’s argue “that advocacy 
advertising plays an important social, democratic and political role” and that 
this was recognized by the Court in Sullivan.97   The authors study the social 
and historical context of the decision and show the impact it had on newspaper 
coverage of the civil rights movement.98  
As we have seen, the commercial speech doctrine has received a thorough 
and thought provoking examination since its inception.  The literature 
addressing the doctrine has remained relatively thematically consistent.  
Scholars have argued for greater or lesser protection, a distinction or lack of 
 
 
94 Id. at 526. 
 
95 Id. at 535. 
 
96 See generally Ross and Bird, supra note 18. 
 
97 Id. at 490. 
 
98 Id. at 490. 
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distinction between commercial and other types of protected speech, and 
whether or not to retain or abolish the doctrine altogether.  Other scholars have 
examined the historical basis for some decisions, while others have examined 
the First Amendment values that guide the doctrine.  Whatever the approach, 
there remains some consensus that the doctrine has remained in flux since its 
inception.  To better understand why this may be the case we turn to a study of 
the doctrine’s history. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A HISTORY OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE 
 
 
 
Commercial Speech 1942-1976: Slouching Toward Protection 
 
The history of the commercial speech doctrine is rooted in an incident in New 
York City involving F.J. Chrestensen, who owned a decommissioned naval 
submarine that he opened to the public for a small admission fee.99  Chrestensen 
advertised his tours through handbills passed out to pedestrians in lower Manhattan.  
City officials informed Chrestensen that his handbill distribution was in violation of 
the New York City Sanitary Code which specifically prohibited the distribution of 
“commercial and business advertising matter.”100  Political speech was exempted 
from the regulation, so Chrestensen reprinted the handbills to include a political 
message petitioning the City Dock Department’s refusal to let him dock his 
submarine at a city pier.101  The city still refused permission to distribute.  
Chrestensen sought an injunction against the police department from interfering 
with his constitutionally protected speech.  The case eventually made its way to the 
Supreme Court.   
In a unanimous three-page decision, the Court decided against Chrestensen.  
The Court said although streets are traditionally places where the dissemination of 
information “may not be unduly” burdened or proscribed by the government, “the 
 
99 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
 
100 Id. at 53. 
 
101 Id. at 53. 
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Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely 
commercial advertising.”102  In categorically denying protection to commercial 
advertising, the Court not only failed to provide much of a rationale for its decision, 
it did not define what was meant by “purely commercial advertising.”  Two decades 
later, confronted with this very issue, the Court began the process of chipping away 
at its decision in Valentine and forging a path to greater, although limited, 
protection for commercial speech. 
In 1964, the Supreme Court moved closer to First Amendment protection for 
commercial speech with the landmark libel case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.103  
L.B. Sullivan, the Commissioner who supervised Montgomery police, brought a 
libel suit against four clergymen and the New York Times for publishing the 
editorial advertisement, “Heed Their Rising Voices.”  The full-page editorial, which 
ran on March 29, 1960, harshly criticized police action against a civil rights protest 
at an Alabama state university.  The editorial also solicited contributions for the 
Martin Luther King defense fund.  The Times argued that the ad was protected by 
the First Amendment.  Sullivan argued, relying on Valentine, that because the 
allegedly libelous statements were published as part of a paid advertisement, 
freedom of speech and of the press did not apply to his case.104   
The Supreme Court of Alabama sided with Sullivan, but the U.S. Supreme 
Court disagreed.  Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, said editorial 
 
102 Id. at 54. 
 
103 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 
104 Id. at 265. 
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advertisements of this type were an important avenue for the dissemination of 
ideas.105  The Court distinguished between the advertisement in question and the 
“purely commercial speech” in Valentine: 
The publication here was not a “commercial” advertisement in the 
sense in which the word was used in Chrestensen.  It 
communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, 
protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of 
a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the 
highest public interest and concern.  That the Times was paid for 
publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as 
is the fact that newspapers and books are sold.106
 
The opinion noted that even though Chrestensen added a political statement to his 
handbill, he did so only to evade the ordinance.107  Therefore his handbill was 
purely commercial speech and not the type of advertisement the Court was 
considering in Sullivan.  According to one scholar, Sullivan “substantially improved 
the status of advertising by establishing that even though they were paid for, 
political advertisements were protected by the Constitution.”108
The Court did not return to the question of purely commercial speech until 
almost a decade later in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human 
Relations.109  In 1969, the National Organization for Women (NOW) filed a 
complaint with the Commission claiming Pittsburgh Press was violating a city 
 
105 Id. at 266. 
 
106 Id. at 266. 
 
107 Id. at 266. 
 
108 See An, supra note 26, at 213. 
 
109 413 U.S. 376 (1973). 
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ordinance that prohibited “any notice or advertisement relating to ‘employment’ or 
membership which indicates any discrimination because of…sex.”110  Pittsburgh 
Press divided its help wanted columns under the headings “Help Wanted Male” and 
“Help Wanted Female.” 
In a 5-4 decision the Court upheld the lower court’s ruling that the ordinance 
did not infringe on the paper’s First Amendment rights.  In doing so, the Court 
reaffirmed an important idea first given voice a decade earlier in New York Times, 
Co. v. Sullivan,111 that profit motive does not solely determine whether speech is 
protected or not: 
If a newspaper’s profit motive were determinative, all aspects of its 
operations—from the selection of news stories to the choice of 
editorial position—would be subject to regulation if it could be 
established that they were conducted with the view toward 
increased sales.  Such a basis for regulation clearly would be 
incompatible with the First Amendment.112
 
However, the Court found that the advertisements in question were “classic 
examples of commercial speech” that did not come under First Amendment 
protection, thus applying the rule in Valentine. 113  Pittsburgh Press argued that 
commercial speech should be accorded a higher level of protection than that 
provided by Valentine.  The Court’s response?  “Whatever the merits of this 
 
110 Id. at 378. 
 
111 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 
112 413 U.S. 376 (1973) at 385. 
 
113 Id. at 385. 
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contention may be in other contexts, it is unpersuasive in this case.”114  Any First 
Amendment considerations in the present case where outweighed by the illegality 
of the underlying conduct.115  The language in Pittsburgh Press and in the next 
commercial speech case, Bigelow v. Virginia,116 seemed to open the door ever so 
slightly to First Amendment protection for commercial speech.117   
Bigelow was director and managing editor of the newspaper The Virginia 
Weekly.  He got in trouble with a Virginia statute that outlawed “the sale or 
circulation of any publication to encourage or prompt the processing of an abortion” 
when he printed an advertisement for abortion services in New York state.118  
Bigelow printed the following advertisement: 
UNWANTED PREGNANCY LET US HELP YOU abortions are 
now legal in New York.  There are no residency requirements.  
FOR IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN ACCREDITED 
HOSPITALS AND CLINICS AT LOW COST 
Contact WOMEN’S PAVILION 515 Madison Avenue New York, 
N.Y. 10022 or call any time (212) 371-6670 or (212) 371-6650 
AVAILABLE 7 DAYS A WEEK STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.  
 
114 Id. at 388. 
 
115 Id. at 388. 
 
116 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
 
117 Although the ban on Pittsburgh Press’ gender biased classified section was upheld, it was a split 
decision and the dissents by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas, Stewart and Blackmun are 
noteworthy.  It is to be recalled that Justice Douglas was on the Court during the time of its unanimous 
decision in Valentine.  In his dissent, Douglas refers to his changing opinion over the years regarding 
commercial speech:  “Commercial matter, as distinguished from news, was held in Valentine v. 
Chrestensen not subject to First Amendment protection.  My views on that issue have changed since 
1942, the year Valentine was decided.  As I have stated on early occasions, I believe that commercial 
materials also have First Amendment protection” (Douglas, J. dissenting at 397-8); See also An, supra 
note 26, at 212 (writing that “[t]welve years after Valentine, [Douglas] began to point out the 
deficiencies in the unanimous decision and came to advance the value of commercial information in 
the free enterprise system”). 
 
118 421 U.S. 809 (1975) at 812. 
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We will make all arrangements for you and help you with 
information and counseling.119
 
Although the advertisement conveyed factual information, Bigelow was convicted 
and fined $500.  The conviction was upheld by the Virginia State Supreme Court 
which rejected Bigelow’s claim that the statute was unconstitutional.  On appeal, 
the Supreme Court overturned Bigelow’s conviction.  
In writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun reasserted that speech that appears in 
paid commercial advertisements does not automatically lose all First Amendment 
protection.120  The Court also limited the reach of its ruling in Valentine.  The Court 
said the fact that Valentine “had the effect of banning a particular handbill does not 
mean that [it] is authority for the proposition that all statues regulating commercial 
advertising are immune from constitutional challenge.”121  The Court referred to its 
ruling in Pittsburgh Press that “indicated that the advertisements would have 
received some degree of First Amendment protection if the commercial proposal 
had been legal.”122  The Court said Bigelow’s advertisement was “factual material,” 
about a legal activity and a matter of “public interest,” that “did more than simply 
propose a commercial transaction”123:   
Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed information of 
potential interest and value to a diverse audience—not only to 
 
119 Id. at 812. 
 
120 Id. at 818. 
 
121 Id. at 820-821. 
 
122 Id. at 822. 
 
123 Id. at 826. 
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readers probably in need of the services offered, but also to those 
with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the subject 
matter of the law of another State and its development, and to 
readers seeking reform in Virginia.124
 
In Bigelow, we see the beginning of the Court’s interest in protecting the listener’s 
right to receive potentially valuable information.  This rationale for protecting 
commercial speech would be expanded one year later in Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.125  
 
Under the Umbrella:  Virginia Pharmacy to Central Hudson 
 
In 1976, the Court decided a case that provided commercial speech some level 
of First Amendment protection.126  Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
representing a number of prescription drug users, mainly the elderly and the 
infirmed, challenged a Virginia statute that prohibited pharmacists from advertising 
prescription drug prices.  This was the second time the statute had been challenged.  
A failed first attempt was brought by a licensed pharmacist.127  But this time it was 
challenged by consumers, a distinction that was important to a three-judge district 
 
124 Id. at 826. 
 
125 425 U.S. 748 (1976) at 826 (stating that the “relationship of speech to the marketplace of products 
or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas”).  
 
126 See An, supra note 26, at 220 (writing that in Virginia Pharmacy the “Court finally explicitly 
overruled Valentine, thus providing First Amendment protection to ‘purely commercial advertising’”).  
 
127 425 U.S. 748 (1976) at 753. 
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court that declared the statute void.128  The Supreme Court affirmed the district 
court’s ruling. 
The Virginia State Board of Pharmacy’s argument followed the Court’s ruling 
in Valentine; that advertising of prescription drug prices was outside First 
Amendment protection because it is purely commercial speech.  The plaintiffs 
argued they would benefit greatly if the ban was lifted and that access to the 
prohibited information was a constitutional right.129  Justice Blackmun, writing for 
the majority, continued his line of thought from Bigelow; that the information 
contained in the advertising had social value even if the pharmacist’s intent was for 
solely commercial purposes.130  From the listener’s perspective, the Court reasoned, 
advertised prescription drug prices is valuable information.  So valuable that the 
opinion’s language places commercial information alongside speech that is 
important to democratic decision-making: 
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may 
seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is 
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what 
price [….E]ven if the First Amendment were thought to be 
primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a 
democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does 
not serve that goal.131
 
 
128 Id. at 755. 
 
129 Id. at 754. 
 
130 Id. at 761 (the majority states that “[o]ur pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on any subject, 
cultural, philosophical, or political.  He does not wish to report any particularly newsworthy fact, or to 
make generalized observations even about commercial matters.  The ‘idea’ he wishes to communicate 
is simply this: ‘I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price’”). 
 
131 Id. at 765. 
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Although this seems to equate political speech and commercial advertising,132 
the latter is subject to greater regulation.  For example, the Court distinguishes 
between the levels of falsehood tolerated in each.  In political speech, considerable 
falsehood is permitted so as not to create a “chilling effect.”133  On the other hand, 
for commercial speech to receive protection, it must be truthful.  This should not be 
a hard requirement to satisfy, the Court reasons, because the “truth of commercial 
speech, for example, may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator than, let us 
say, news reporting or political commentary.”134  It also has the ability to withstand 
greater scrutiny because it is hardier and more durable than other types of protected 
 
132 In the sole dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist feared that the logical consequences of the Court’s 
decision would put commercial speech on a par with traditionally protected speech such as political 
speech; that the decision’s far reaching consequences would be to elevate “commercial intercourse 
between a seller hawking his wares and a buyer seeking to strike a bargain to the same plane as has 
been previously reserved for the free marketplace of ideas.” at 781 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).    He 
wrote that the First Amendment protects information that is important to democratic decision-making 
in the area of political, social and public issues and not information that involves “whether to purchase 
one or another kind of shampoo.” at 787 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).  A few years later, Justice Powell, 
writing for the Court in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978), seems to attempt an 
answer to Rehnquist’s Virginia Pharmacy dissent.  In the opinion, Powell recognizes “the ‘common-
sense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area 
traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech.”  Powell suggests that this 
“common-sense” distinction will keep protected lower-valued speech from diluting higher valued 
speech:  “To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech 
alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment’s guarantee 
with respect to the latter kind of speech.  Rather than subject the First Amendment to such a 
devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, 
commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing 
modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.” at 456. 
133 For example, in cases of libel against public officials acting in their official capacity, the Court said 
the “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and …it must be protected if the freedoms of 
expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they need to survive.” New York Times, Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) at 272. 
 
134 425 U.S. 748 (1976) at footnote 24. 
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speech;135 it is more difficult to “chill” the flow of commercial information since 
“advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits.”136
In Virginia Pharmacy the Court officially held for the first time that truthful 
speech which does nothing more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled 
to First Amendment protection.  Virginia Pharmacy is, for this reason, widely 
considered the beginning of the modern commercial speech doctrine.  The 
following term, a case dealing with lawyer advertising provided the Court with the 
opportunity to revisit and reexamine its rulings in Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy. 
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona137 a pair of licensed attorneys violated a 
disciplinary rule of the Supreme Court of Arizona when they advertised their legal 
services and fees in the Arizona Republic.  The rule stated, among other things, that 
a “lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other 
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm.”138  Facing possible suspensions for the 
violation, the lawyers sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court.  They argued 
that the rule impeded their First Amendment rights.139  The Arizona Supreme Court 
 
135Id. at footnote 24. 
 
136 Id. at footnote 24 (stating that “[a]ttributes such as these, the greater objectivity and hardiness of 
commercial speech, may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing 
the speaker.  They may also make it appropriate to require that a commercial message appear in such a 
form, or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers as are necessary to prevent its 
being deceptive.  They may also make inapplicable the prohibition against prior restraints”). 
 
137 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
 
138 Id. at 355. 
 
139 Id. at 356. 
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upheld the constitutionality of the rule.  On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed in part and upheld an attorney’s right to advertise.140   
In writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun once again framed the First 
Amendment issue in terms of the consumer’s right to information.  Looking back at 
Virginia Pharmacy, the Court reaffirmed that commercial speech “should not be 
withdrawn from protection merely because it proposed a mundane commercial 
transaction.”141  As in Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy, the Court found that such 
commercial transactions often include valuable information that the public has a 
right to access: 
The listener’s interest is substantial: the consumer’s concern for 
the free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than 
his concern for urgent political dialogue[….]  And commercial 
speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and 
prices of products and services, and thus performs and 
indispensable role in the allocation of resources in a free enterprise 
system […]  In short, such speech serves individual and societal 
interests in assuring informed and reliable decision-making.142
 
Thus, the State Bar of Arizona’s ban on lawyer advertising, like the Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy’s ban on advertised prices, served only to keep the public 
ignorant of important information.143
 
140 Id. 
 
141 Id. at 364.  Justice Blackmun also reaffirmed that commercial speech could and should be 
distinguished from non-commercial speech (“it ‘must be distinguished by its content’” citing Virginia 
Pharmacy at 761) but that this does not strip it of all First Amendment protection. 
 
142 Id. at 364. 
 
143 Id. at 365.  The public’s right to the information contained in commercial messages is an important 
consideration in these early cases.  Indeed, without this key element, a commercial transaction that 
involves speech is almost entirely stripped of its First Amendment protection.  Consider Ohralik v. 
Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978) which involved a suit against an Ohio attorney engaged in 
the direct solicitation of potential clients.  The attorney argued that face-to-face solicitation was “‘an 
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With reasoning largely based on the right of consumers to receive the 
information contained in commercial messages, Virginia Pharmacy and Bates 
recognized a limited First Amendment right to commercial speech.  Yet, neither 
opinion established a test to determine the level of protection that should be 
afforded commercial speech.  This would come a few years later.  In the interval, 
the Court handed down two important cases involving corporate political speech 
that would eventually implicate the commercial speech realm144—First National 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti145 decided in 1978 and Consolidated Edison Company of 
New York, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of New York146 decided in 1980. 
Bellotti arose when the attorney general of Massachusetts informed First 
National Bank that it could not pay to publicize its views on a proposed 
constitutional amendment promoting a graduated income tax.147  At issue was a 
Massachusetts statute that prohibited corporations from spending money “‘for the 
purpose of…influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to voters” 
that did not “materially” or directly affect that corporation’s property, business or 
 
exercise of free speech rights’” constitutionally identical to the rights protected in Bates. 436 U.S. 447 
(1978) at 456.  The Court disagreed, ruling that unlike speech that conveyed information, the face-to-
face solicitation is “a business transaction in which speech is an essential but subordinate component.” 
436 U.S. 447 (1978) at 457.  These types of business transactions, where speech is a subordinate 
component, could still receive First Amendment protection but the “level of appropriate judicial 
scrutiny” is lowered. 436 U.S. 447 (1978) at 457.   
 
144 These two areas of the law collided in Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) when Nike insisted that 
its corporate speech was political when it was accused of disseminating false commercial speech. 
 
145 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 
146 447 U.S. 530 (1980). 
 
147 435 U.S. 765 (1978) at 768. 
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assets.148  First National Bank challenged the constitutionality of the statute and the 
case made its way to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.  The statute was 
upheld.  National Bank then appealed to, and was granted certiorari by, the United 
States Supreme Court. 
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, noted that the principle question asked 
by the lower court was “‘whether business corporations, such as [appellants], have 
First Amendment rights coextensive with those of natural persons or associations of 
natural persons.’”149   By contrast, Justice Powell focused on whether the statute 
abridged speech deserving of First Amendment protection regardless of who the 
speaker was.  The speech in question, Powell wrote, “is at the heart of the First 
Amendment protection.”150  Therefore,  
[i]f the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest 
that the State could silence their proposed speech.  It is the type of 
speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is 
no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather 
than an individual.  The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its 
capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity 
of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or, 
individual.151
 
 
148 Id. at 768. 
 
149 Id. at 771. 
 
150 Id. at 776.  (“‘The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at 
the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous 
restraint or fear of subsequent punishment…Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic 
function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to 
enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period” quoting Thornhil v. 
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1940)).  
 
151 Id. at 777. 
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The question then, is not whether corporations have First Amendment rights but 
whether speech with a “clear entitlement of protection” is deprived of that 
protection because of the corporate identity of the speaker.152  The Court ruled that 
it was not. 
The constitutional protection afforded corporate speech by Bellotti was 
reinforced in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission of New 
York.153  Consolidated Edison, a public utility, included inserts in its monthly bills 
promoting nuclear energy.154  The National Resources Defense Council, Inc. asked 
Consolidated Edison to enclose a rebuttal prepared by the NRDC in its next billing 
cycle.  Consolidated Edison refused.  The NRDC then asked the Public Service 
Commission to open the electric company’s bills to contrasting viewpoints on 
public issues.155  The Commission denied the request but then barred the general 
use of electric company bill inserts to discuss “‘controversial issues of public 
policy.’”156  Consolidated Edison sought review of the ban in the New York State 
courts.  The ban was upheld.  The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower 
court’s decision holding that the prohibition infringed upon Consolidated’s First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.157
 
152 Id. at 778. 
 
153 447 U.S. 530 (1980). 
 
154 Id. at 532. 
 
155 Id. at 532. 
 
156 Id. at 532. 
 
157 Id. at 544. 
 
  36
                                                
1980 was not a good year for the Public Service Commission of New York.  In 
the landmark commercial speech case, Central Hudson Gas Electric Corp.  v. 
Public Service Commission of New York,158 which was decided the same day as 
Consolidated Edison, the Court once again ruled against the Commission.  The state 
of New York, in the interest of conserving energy during the middle-eastern oil 
embargo crisis in the early 1970s, banned advertising by electric utilities.  The ban 
remained on the books after the crisis was over; it was eventually challenged by 
Central Hudson.  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the ban violated the First 
Amendment and in doing so outlined a four-part test to determine the 
constitutionality of commercial speech regulations. 
Looking back at the history of commercial speech cases, Justice Powell, writing 
for the majority, said “a four-part analysis has developed.”159  The first part is 
concerned with whether the speech is protected or not.  For commercial speech to 
receive protection it cannot be misleading or deceptive or related to illegal 
activity.160  The second part asks whether the government has a substantial interest 
in regulating the speech.161  If it has a substantial interest, the Court then asks 
whether the “regulation directly advances” the interest.162  If all these are satisfied, 
the final prong requires that the regulation be “narrowly drawn” or narrowly 
 
158 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 
159 Id. at 566. 
 
160 Id. at 566. 
 
161 Id. at 564. 
 
162 Id. at 564. 
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tailored.163  The New York Commission’s advertising regulation failed the fourth 
prong.  The Court found that the blanket ban on all electricity advertising was too 
broad.164  Particularly damaging to the New York Commission was Central 
Hudson’s argument that it would promote energy conservation had it not been for 
the ban.  In other words, the ban actually impaired the State’s interest in promoting 
energy conservation.165
The first part of the Central Hudson test asks whether the commercial speech 
qualifies for First Amendment protection.  This assumes the speech in question is 
commercial rather than non-commercial.  But what about speech that communicates 
a social or a political message and at the same time draws attention to a brand name 
or corporate sponsorship?  This question was one of the central issues in a 1983 
case, Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.166   
Youngs was distributing direct mail advertising that promoted a wide variety of 
contraceptive devices including its most popular product, Trojan-brand condoms.  
The advertising included a multi-page promotional flyer and one exclusively 
devoted to prophylactics.  It also included “informational pamphlets discussing the 
 
163 Id. at 565.  The government cannot “completely suppress information when narrower restrictions on 
expression would serve its interests as well.”  This language in Central Hudson would be modified by 
a later case, Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox 492 U.S. 469 (1989).  In Fox, the Court said 
to pass the fourth prong the government must show a “reasonable fit” between the regulation and the 
government interest. 
 
164 Id. at 570. 
 
165 Id. at 570. 
 
166 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
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desirability and availability of prophylactics in general.” 167  The Postal Service 
informed the manufacturer that its unsolicited mail advertising violated Title 39 
U.S.C. 3001 (e) which “states that ‘any unsolicited advertisement of matter which is 
designed, adapted, or intended for preventing conception is nonmailable 
matter.’”168  Youngs brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief arguing 
that the statute violated its First Amendment rights. 
The Federal District Court held that the statute violated the First Amendment.  
The Supreme Court agreed.  The Court said the government’s asserted interest, to 
help parents control when and how their children would learn about sensitive 
subjects, was indeed substantial.  However, the restriction provided “only the most 
limited incremental support for the interest asserted” and therefore failed the third 
prong of Central Hudson analysis.169  The Court also said because the restriction 
purged “all mailboxes of unsolicited material that is entirely suitable for adults” it 
was too broad to satisfy the final prong of the test.170
An interesting aspect of the case was the question of how to classify Youngs’ 
informational pamphlets.  In arriving at the decision, the Court agreed with the 
lower court that all three of Youngs’ advertising materials were commercial speech.  
The Court recognized its long-held “‘common sense’ distinction between speech 
proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to 
 
167 Id. at 62. 
 
168 Id. at 61. 
 
169 Id. at 73. 
 
170 Id. at 73. 
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government regulation, and other varieties of speech.”171  The Court said, following 
Virginia Pharmacy, that most of the speech in the advertising materials “did no 
more than propose a commercial transaction.”172  However, the informational 
pamphlets could not so easily be characterized this way and therefore required 
further analysis. 
The Court used a limited-purpose three-part analysis to categorize the 
informational pamphlets.173  First, citing Sullivan, the Court said acknowledging the 
pamphlets were advertisements did not automatically classify them as commercial 
speech; neither did “the reference to a specific product” nor Youngs’ economic 
motivation justify this classification.174  However, the Court reasoned, the 
combination of all of these did characterize them as commercial speech: 
The mailings constitute commercial speech notwithstanding the 
fact that they contain discussions of important public issues such as 
venereal disease and family planning.  We have made clear that 
advertising which “links a product to a current public debate” is 
not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded 
noncommercial speech.175   
 
Commercial speech does not need additional constitutional protection, the Court 
reasoned, because companies already have “the full panoply of protection 
 
171 Id. at 64. 
 
172 Id. at 66. 
 
173 Id. at 67.  In a footnote, the Court stated that the three part analysis used to determine the category 
of speech in Bolger did not constitute a broad test such as the Central Hudson test. 
 
174 Id. at 66. 
 
175 Id. at 68. 
 
  40
                                                
available.”176  The Court also feared that full protection might lead to the 
immunization of “false or misleading product information from government 
regulation simply by including references to public issues.”177
As Langvardt points out, after Virginia Pharmacy, Bolger, Central Hudson, and 
other related cases decided during this period, restrictions on truthful, non-
misleading commercial speech seemed unlikely to pass the First Amendment 
scrutiny established by the Central Hudson test.178  In particular, Central Hudson 
and Bolger seemed to suggest that the third and fourth prongs presented a 
formidable challenge to regulations on commercial speech.179  However, a string of 
cases from 1986 to 1993 leaves a different impression:  one of confusion wrought 
by doctrinal inconsistency.   
 
Post-Central Hudson Confusion 
 
In the first of these cases, Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co.,180 a 
five–member majority seemed to scale back the earlier trend toward greater 
protection for commercial speech.  The majority opinion paid great deference to the 
government’s argument that its speech restrictions were a direct, non-extensive 
means of advancing its substantial interests.  In addition, Posadas offered an 
 
176 Id. at 68. 
 
177 Id. at 68. 
 
178 See Langvardt, supra note 74, at 602. 
 
179 Id. at 602. 
 
180 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
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alternative mode of analysis to the Central Hudson test—that if the activity or 
product being advertised is not constitutionally protected, governments are free to 
regulate it as they deem necessary.181
In 1948, the Puerto Rican Legislature passed The Games of Chance Act in order 
to stimulate tourism.  The act legalized gambling in licensed casinos but prohibited 
gambling rooms from advertising or otherwise offering “their facilities to the public 
of Puerto Rico.”182  Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, owners of a hotel and 
casino, were fined and threatened with suspension of their license for violating the 
act’s advertising restrictions.  Posadas paid the fine under protest and then sought 
review in the Puerto Rican courts.  The Superior and Supreme Courts of Puerto 
Rico upheld the statute as did the U.S. Supreme Court. 
In determining Posadas, then Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 
applied the Central Hudson test.  The majority accepted the government’s argument 
that gambling would have an adverse effect on the local population and therefore 
agreed that the government had a substantial interest in dampening this demand.  
The majority also accepted the government’s argument that the advertising ban 
would further that interest: 
The Puerto Rico Legislature obviously believed, when it enacted 
the advertising restriction at issue here, that advertising of casino 
gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico would serve to 
 
181 See Denise M. Trauth and John L. Huffman “The Commercial Speech Doctrine: Posadas 
Revisionism” in Advertising and Commercial Speech 99 (1990) at 111.  (The authors write, “[p]ut very 
simply, if the conduct is constitutionally protected, such as access to contraceptives or abortion, the 
advertising cannot be banned.  However, if the conduct is not constitutionally protected, such as access 
to casino gambling, the advertising can be banned”). 
 
182 478 U.S. 328 (1986) at 332. 
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increase the demand for the product advertised.  We think the 
legislature’s belief is a reasonable one, and the fact that [Posadas] 
has chosen to litigate this case all the way to this Court indicates 
that [Posadas] shares the legislature’s view.183  
 
The Court also concluded that the ban was sufficiently narrow because it did not 
ban all casino ads, just those targeted at the Puerto Rican public.184  The ban 
therefore passed all four phases of Central Hudson analysis.       
For Rehnquist, the advertising ban was constitutionally permissible because the 
legislature could, if it wanted to, ban casino advertising altogether: 
[I]t is precisely because the government could have enacted a 
wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct that it is 
permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of 
allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions 
on advertising.185
 
Thus the Court drew a distinction between the advertising in Posadas and that in 
earlier cases such as Bigelow.  In Bigelow, the advertisement’s underlying conduct 
“was constitutionally protected and could not have been prohibited by the State.”186  
On the other hand, gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico is not a constitutional 
right and since the government had the power to ban the conduct altogether, this 
“necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling.”187
 
183 Id. at 341-342. 
 
184 Id. at 343. 
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186 Id. at 345. 
 
187 Id. at 346. 
 
  43
                                                
Another commercial speech case involving gambling was decided by the Court 
seven years later.  Once again, the Court had an opportunity to examine advertising 
that dealt with “vice” related activities, this time a state lottery.  However, in U.S. v. 
Edge Broadcasting Co.,188 the Court dismissed the government’s argument based 
on Posadas “that the greater power to prohibit gambling necessarily includes the 
lesser power to ban its advertisement.”189   
Edge Broadcasting Company owned and ran a licensed radio station in North 
Carolina near the Virginia border.  Ninety-percent of the station’s listeners lived in 
neighboring Virginia.  To boost revenue, the station decided to run commercials for 
the Virginia lottery.  However, because North Carolina does not have a lottery, this 
violated a federal statute.  18 U.S.C. 1304 only allows “broadcasters to advertise 
state-run lotteries on stations licensed to a State which conducts such lotteries.”190  
The station was therefore barred against broadcasting the advertisements for the 
Virginia lottery.  Edge filed a suit arguing the restriction violated the First 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.  The case made its way to the 
Supreme Court.   
 
188 509 U.S. 418 (1993). 
 
189 Id. at 425.  The 1996 case 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 effectively  put an end 
to the “greater-includes-the lesser” reasoning:  “The text of the First Amendment makes clear that the 
Constitution presumes that attempts to regulate speech are more dangerous than attempts to regulate 
conduct.  That presumption accords with the essential role that the free flow of information plays in a 
democratic society.  As a result, the First Amendment directs that government may not suppress 
speech as easily as it may suppress conduct, and that speech restrictions cannot be treated as simply 
another means that the government may use to achieve its ends.” at 512. 
 
190 United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) at 418. 
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In applying Central Hudson, the Court said the advertisements were for a lawful 
activity and were not misleading or deceptive.  The Court also stated that the 
government had “a substantial interest in supporting the policy of non-lottery states, 
as well as not interfering with the policy of states that permit lotteries.”191  And the 
Court disagreed with a lower court’s ruling that the statutes failed to “advance 
directly” the government interest.192  Thus the statute passed the first three phases 
of the test.   
The Court now needed to resolve the fourth part of the test, whether the 
regulation was more extensive than necessary to serve the government interest.  The 
Court considered this in light of its ruling in Board of Trustees, State University of 
New York v. Fox.193  In Fox, the Court noted that in decisions following Central 
Hudson, the forth prong had occasionally been interpreted to mean that the 
regulation must be the “least restrictive” possible.194  However, in Fox, the Court 
modified the fourth prong and said it required “only a reasonable ‘fit’ between the 
government’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.”195  The Court 
ruled that it was indeed reasonable to require Edge to comply with the statute.  
Doing so, the Court reasoned, “advances the governmental interest in enforcing the 
 
191 Id. at 426. 
 
192 Id. at 427. 
 
193 492 U.S. 469 (1989). 
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restriction in non-lottery States, while not interfering with the policy of lottery 
States like Virginia.”196
In a sharp dissent, Justice Stevens said the government in Edge “unquestionably 
flunked” the reasonable fit test197 and that the Court’s decision contradicted its 
ruling in Bigelow that struck down a ban on the advertising of out-of-state abortion 
services.  In Bigelow, the Court “held that a State ‘may not, under the guise of 
exercising internal police powers, bar a citizen of another State from disseminating 
information about an activity that is legal in that State.’”198  It was unfair to assume, 
as had the majority in Posadas, that the advertisement in Bigelow was only 
protected because the underlying conduct was a constitutional right.199  For 
Stevens, Bigelow could not be read so narrowly; the case is about more than a 
constitutional right to an abortion, it’s “about paternalism, and informational 
protectionism.  It is about one State’s interference with its citizen’s fundamental 
right to travel in a state of enlightenment, not government-induced ignorance.”200  
This, according to Stevens, was what the ban on Edge’s advertising amounted to.  It 
is the most dangerous and intrusive “form of regulation possible” because it bans 
 
196 509 U.S. 418 (1993) at 430. 
 
197 Id. at 436 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 
198 Id. at 437 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 
199 Id. at 438 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
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truthful speech about lawful activity and is “imposed for the purpose of 
manipulating, through ignorance, the consumer choices of some of its citizens.”201  
Justice Stevens decried the government’s attempts to “manipulate public 
behavior” by banning “speech.”202  The themes sounded in this dissent suggest his 
growing dissatisfaction with the commercial speech doctrine and its reliance on 
what he thought was a less-than-clear distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech.  This latter theme, which would be developed in later cases, 
appeared in incipient form in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network Inc.,203 an 
opinion he wrote three months prior to Edge. 
The case involved a Cincinnati municipal code that banned, for aesthetic and 
safety purposes, newsracks that were used to distribute commercial publications but 
that allowed newsracks for traditional newspapers.  The city justified this 
preferential treatment because of the lower value accorded commercial speech 
compared to other types of protected speech.204  The Court struck down the ban that 
it said amounted to content discrimination.  In doing so, Justice Stevens discussed 
the many similarities between the two types of publications.205  He also noted the 
“difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a 
 
201 Id. at 439 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 
202 Id. at 436 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 
203 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
 
204 Id.  at 415. 
 
205 Id. at 423.  (“Under the Fox test it is clear that much of the material in ordinary newspapers is 
commercial speech and, conversely, that the editorial content in respondents’ promotional publications 
is not what we have described as ‘core’ commercial speech”). 
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distinct category.”206  In addition, he wrote that it was wrong for the city to attach 
“more importance to the distinction between commercial and non-commercial 
speech than our cases warrant.” 207  For Stevens, the city’s discrimination “seriously 
under estimate[d] the value of commercial speech.”208  For scholars such as Smolla, 
the message of Discovery is clear:  The “government may not ‘pick on’ commercial 
speech just because it is commercial speech.”209  
 
Strengthening the Test:  The 1990s “Vice” Cases 
The inconsistency that characterized the Court’s commercial speech rulings 
between 1986 and 1993 raised questions for the commercial speech doctrine.  
Would the Court’s decisions continue to show deference to government regulations 
as in Posadas and Edge or would the review of such restrictions be applied more 
rigorously as in Discovery?  Was the Central Hudson test a stringent enough test for 
commercial speech?  Or would the Court discard the test in favor of a stricter 
standard of review?  These questions began to be worked out in a string of cases 
beginning in 1995.  In these cases, Justice Stevens, one of the Court’s most 
outspoken proponents for commercial speech protection, would continue to play a 
prominent role.   
 
206 Id. at 419. 
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The first of the “vice” cases, Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.210 arose when Coors, 
after having its proposed labels and advertising rejected by the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms, challenged a federal statute that prohibited “beer labels from 
displaying alcohol content.”211  Coors filed the suit in federal district court on First 
Amendment grounds.  The government argued that the ban was necessary to curtail 
“strength wars” among producers who would seek to increase market share by 
promising the most potent brew.212  The district court found the ban 
unconstitutional.  On appeal, the 10th Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling.  The 
appeals court found that although the government had a substantial interest in 
curbing “strength wars,” the ban failed to directly and materially advance that 
interest.  The United States Supreme Court affirmed and in doing so applied 
Central Hudson analysis.213
All parties involved agreed that the labels conveyed truthful, non-misleading 
factual information about a legal product.214  The Supreme Court also agreed with 
the lower courts that the government  
has a significant interest in protecting the health, safety, and 
welfare of its citizens by preventing brewers from competing on 
the basis of alcohol strength, which could lead to greater 
alcoholism and its attendant social costs.215   
 
210 514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
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The “critical” third prong of Central Hudson required that the commercial 
speech regulation directly advance that interest.  Justice Thomas, writing for Court, 
cites Edenfield v. Fane,216 decided two years earlier, in which the third factor was 
revised.217  The Edenfield Court said the government must show that the 
“regulation advances the government’s interest ‘in a direct and material way.’”218  
Justice Thomas said the labeling ban not only failed to do this, but amounted to an 
irrational regulatory scheme.219  For example, although beer labels could not 
disclose alcohol content, beer advertisements could if not prohibited by state law.  
As a result, 32 states allowed beer producers to disclose alcohol content in their 
advertisements.  For Thomas, the  
failure to prohibit the disclosure of alcohol content in advertising, 
which would seem to constitute a more influential weapon in any 
strength war than labels, makes no rational sense if the 
Government’s true aim is to suppress strength wars.220
 
In addition, the government failed to present any convincing evidence that the 
ban materially and directly advanced its interest; at best the government offered 
 
216 507 U.S. 761 (1993). 
 
217 See Vladeck, supra note 75, at 1056 (writing that Edenfield “gave teeth to Central Hudson’s third 
prong”:  “In language not before seen in commercial speech cases, the Edenfield Court emphasized 
that it is not enough for the government simply to point to a substantial governmental interest; the 
government also bears the burden of demonstrating that the restriction furthers the interest ‘in a direct 
and material way’”). 
 
218 514 U.S. 476 (1995) at 487 quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) at 767.  Edenfield states 
that the government’s burden “is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a 
governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the 
harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.” at 770-
771. 
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only “anecdotal evidence and educated guesses to suggest” that strength wars were 
in fact occurring and if not controlled, “would burst out of control.”221  The Court 
also found that the regulation failed the fourth prong of Central Hudson—it was not 
“sufficiently tailored to its goal.”222  The Court noted a number of less intrusive 
alternatives that could have been used to advance the government’s interests.223
The Coors decision followed the line of cases that applied Central Hudson 
analysis with rigor.  That the opinion was one justice shy of a majority seemed to 
signal the Court’s growing skepticism toward blanket bans on truthful commercial 
speech.  The deference toward the government’s efforts to protect society through 
speech regulations as in Posadas seemed to be a thing of the past.  Yet, even though 
Central Hudson, as applied in Coors, seemed a significant check on commercial 
speech restrictions, Justice Stevens was not satisfied.   
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens asserts that the case should not be 
considered under the commercial speech doctrine at all because the Federal Alcohol 
Administration Act “neither prevents misleading speech nor protects consumers 
from the dangers of incomplete information.”224  In any other context, Stevens 
writes, a truthful statement about alcohol content would receive full first 
amendment protection.225  But because of the commercial context and the Court’s 
 
221 Id. at 490. 
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subsequent “misguided” reliance on Central Hudson, “this case appear[s] more 
difficult than it is.”226
For Stevens, the Central Hudson test “is not related to the reasons for allowing 
more regulation of commercial speech than other speech.”227  These reasons, as set 
forth in Virginia Pharmacy, are related to “commercial speech’s potential to 
mislead”228 and because it is more verifiable than political speech.229  Also, false 
and misleading commercial speech is not only valueless but has potentially severe 
social consequences.230  For these reasons, regulation should only be allowed if 
directed at false and misleading commercial speech.  For Stevens, one of the 
problems of the current commercial speech doctrine is that courts sometimes take 
other motives (e.g. paternalistic motives as in Posadas) seriously.231
It appears then that Justice Stevens is in favor of scrapping the current 
commercial speech doctrine and the Central Hudson test.  Indeed his Coors 
concurrence suggests that any statute restricting truthful and non-misleading 
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commercial speech “should be subjected to the same stringent review as any other 
content-based abridgement of protected speech.”232
Justice Stevens picked up where he left off in his Coors concurrence a year later 
in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island233 in which the Court struck down a Rhode 
Island law that banned “the advertising of retail liquor prices except at the point of 
sale.”234  44 Liqourmart, a licensed liquor retailer, was fined for advertising in a 
Rhode Island newspaper.  The ad showed bottles of liquor next to the word 
“WOW.”  The Rhode Island liquor control board concluded that this suggestion of 
bargain liquor prices violated the ban.  44 Liqourmart, joined by Peoples Super 
Liquor Store, challenged the ban in federal district court on First Amendment 
grounds.235
The district court said Rhode Island failed to produce evidence of the ban’s 
effectiveness.  The ban did not directly advance the state’s interest in decreased 
alcohol consumption and was therefore unconstitutional.236  However, the appeals 
 
232 Id. at 497 (Stevens, J. concurring).  For Stevens, Coors demonstrates the problems with the current 
doctrine and its reliance on “the artificiality of a rigid commercial / non-commercial distinction.”  The 
speech in the present case, “the words ‘4.73% alcohol by volume’” would not be treated as commercial 
“if a non-profit group were to publish the identical statement, ‘Coors beer has 4.72% alcohol by 
volume’ on the cover of a magazine.”  “It thus appears,” Stevens writes, “that whether or not speech is 
‘commercial’ has no necessary relationship to its content. If the Coors label is commercial speech, 
then, I suppose it must be because (as in Central Hudson) the motivation of the speaker is to sell a 
product, or because the speech tends to induce consumers to buy a product.  Yet, economic motivation 
or impact alone cannot make speech less deserving of constitutional protection, or else all authors and 
artists who sell their works would be correspondingly disadvantaged.  Neither can the value of speech 
be diminished solely because its placement on the label of a product.” Id. at 494. 
 
233 517 U.S. 484,489 (1996). 
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court reversed finding “inherent merit” in the state’s assumption that price 
advertising led to price competition, which led to lower prices and consequently to 
increased consumption.237
The Supreme Court justices were unanimous in ruling the ban unconstitutional 
but were split on their rationale.  In all, the decision produced four opinions.  Justice 
Stevens, who wrote the principal opinion for the Court, agreed with the district 
court that the state did not show “that the price advertising ban will significantly 
advance the state’s interest in promoting tolerance,” thus failing the third part of 
Central Hudson.238  The law also flunked the fourth prong when Rhode Island 
failed to “establish a ‘reasonable fit’ between its abridgement of speech and its 
temperance goal.”239  Steven’s cited “alternative forms of regulation” unrelated to 
the restriction of speech that could have been used to achieve the stated goals.240   
Stevens once again took up his position in Coors, calling for stricter scrutiny 
when reviewing government regulations aimed at truthful, non-misleading 
messages about a lawful product “for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair 
bargaining process.”241  When dealing with this type of speech, Stevens writes, 
“there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review than the First 
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Amendment generally demands.”242  Stevens goes on to say, the “First Amendment 
directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the 
dark for what government perceives to be their own good.”243  However, only 
Justices Kennedy and Ginsberg joined him on this point.   
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote that if “the government’s 
asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to 
manipulate their choices in the marketplace,” that interest is “per se illegitimate.”244  
Therefore in such cases, the Central Hudson test “should not be applied.”245  
However, Justice Thomas seemed satisfied with the direction Justice Stevens and 
Justice O’Connor were taking the Central Hudson analysis.   
In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor agreed with Stevens that Rhode 
Island could have controlled liquor prices through a more direct means, such as 
taxation, “without intruding on sellers’ ability to provide truthful, non-misleading 
information to consumers.”246  Taken together, the Stevens opinion and the 
O’Connor concurrence signaled for Justice Thomas a tightening of the fourth prong 
of Central Hudson: 
Both Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor appear to adopt a 
stricter, more categorical interpretation of the fourth prong of 
Central Hudson than that suggested in some of our other opinions, 
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one that could, as a practical matter, go a long way toward the 
position I take…. The opinions would appear to commit the courts 
to striking down restrictions on speech whenever a direct 
regulation (i.e., a regulation involving no restriction on speech 
regarding lawful activity at all) would be an equally effective 
manner of dampening demand by users.247
 
Not only did the separate opinions seem to strengthen the Central Hudson test, 
they also rejected the holding and rationale of Posadas.   In the principal opinion, 
Stevens rejected the “greater-includes-the-lesser” rationale.248  And in her 
concurrence, which was joined by Justices Souter, Breyer and the Chief Justice who 
authored the Posadas opinion, O’Connor noted that although the majority paid 
great deference to the government in Posadas, since then the  
Court has examined more searchingly the State’s professed goal, and 
the speech restriction put into place to further it, before accepting a 
State’s claim that the speech restriction satisfies First Amendment 
scrutiny.249
 
Ten years after Posadas, the Court gutted that opinion’s rationale and 
strengthened the scrutiny of commercial speech regulations under Central Hudson 
analysis.  Although united in their skepticism toward broad-based bans on 
commercial speech, the Justices were divided on their rationale.  A more unified 
Court would emerge on this issue three years later in Greater New Orleans 
Broadcasting Association v. United States.250
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Greater New Orleans once again involved a First Amendment challenge to 
section 1304 of title 18 of the U.S. Code, the same portion of the 1834 
Communications Act that was challenged in Edge Broadcasting.  The statute 
prohibited FCC licensed radio and television stations from broadcasting 
advertisements for a number of gambling activities.251  The regulation also barred 
commercials for privately owned casinos.252  The statute was challenged by an 
association of FCC licensed New Orleans broadcasters who wanted to air radio and 
television commercials for private, for-profit casinos located in Louisiana and 
neighboring Mississippi.253   
Both the district court and Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the 
government, with the Fifth Circuit relying heavily on the ‘greater-includes-the-
lesser” rationale of Posadas.254  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari but 
vacated the judgment of the appeals court and remanded the case for further 
consideration in light of the ruling in 44 Liquormart.  The Firth Circuit majority, 
while recognizing that Central Hudson had “‘become a tougher standard for the 
state to satisfy,’” upheld its earlier ruling for the government.255  At around the 
same time, the Ninth Circuit reached a contrary conclusion in a similar case.256  The 
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Supreme Court, therefore, granted certiorari a second time and unanimously ruled 
the ban unconstitutional.257
Justice Stevens, writing for all but one justice,258 used Central Hudson to strike 
down the ban.  Stevens recognized that “certain judges, scholars and amici curiae 
have advocated repudiation of the Central Hudson standard” in favor of “a more 
straightforward and stringent test.”259  Yet, he wrote invoking 44 Liquormart, 
“reasonable judges may disagree about the merits of some proposals.”260  The 
present case did not call for such a novel approach.  Rather, the application of 
Central Hudson in recent cases provided “an adequate basis for decision.”261
Under the first Central Hudson factor, the Court found that the statute barred 
truthful, non-deceptive commercial messages about a legal product.262  Under the 
second factor, the government argued that casino gambling contributes to such 
social ills as corruption, organized crime, narcotic trafficking and other illegal 
conduct as well as costs related to gambling addiction.263  The Court agreed that 
 
257 Id. at 183. 
 
258 Id. at 197 (Thomas, J. concurring) (reasserting  his position from 44 Liquormart; that “‘[i]n cases 
such as this, in which the government’s asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or service 
ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace,’ the Central Hudson test should not 
be applied because ‘such an ‘interest’ is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of 
‘commercial speech’ than it can justify regulation of ‘noncommercial’ speech’”). 
 
259 Id. at 184. 
 
260 Id. at 184. 
 
261 Id. at 184. 
 
262 Id. at 184. 
 
263 Id. at 185. 
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curbing these social costs was a substantial government interest.264  However, under 
the third factor the Court found that the ban did not directly and materially further 
the interest asserted.265  The Court rejected the government’s assumption that the 
advertising would create a greater demand for gambling.  Casino advertising could, 
after all, “merely channel gamblers from one casino rather than another.”266  The 
Court also invoked Coors, stating that there were more “practical and non-speech 
related forms of regulation” that could be used to further the government’s 
interest.267  Because the government could have used a more direct means for 
achieving its goals, the regulatory scheme was not narrowly tailored.268  Also under 
the fourth factor, the Court once again rejected the “greater-includes-the-lesser” 
rationale:  “the power to prohibit or to regulate particular conduct does not 
necessarily include the power to regulate speech about that conduct.”269
At the same time the Court was strengthening Central Hudson analysis, a 
commercial speech case that presented novel questions was making its way through 
the California courts.  That case, which would present the first formidable challenge 
to the Court’s commercial / noncommercial speech distinction, is the subject of the 
next chapter. 
 
264 Id. at 185. 
 
265 Id. at 187. 
 
266 Id. at 189. 
 
267 Id. at 192. 
 
268 Id. at 192. 
 
269 Id. at 193. 
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   CHATPER 5 
NIKE V. KASKY 
 
 
 
In the spring of 2003, the Supreme Court dismissed a case that some hoped 
would raise the level of protection and do for commercial speech what New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan270 had done for libel law.271  For others, doing so would have 
betrayed the noble purpose of Sullivan—to protect the powerless from the 
powerful.272  At any rate, Nike v. Kasky273 presented novel First Amendment 
questions.  Up until that point, the Court’s commercial speech cases were for the 
most part product information cases.  Nike, however, involved speech that was 
somewhere between product information and comment on matters of public 
interest.  Justice Breyer summed up the crux of the matter during oral argument:  “I 
think its both.  [Nike is] both trying to sell their product and they’re trying to make 
a statement that’s relevant to a public debate.”274  Indeed, the threshold question of 
whether Nike’s statements defending their foreign labor practices were commercial 
 
270 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 
271 See Collins and Skover, supra note 90, at 967 (writing that “[f]or some liberals, libertarians, and 
conservatives, the Nike controversy had less to do with corporate power than with constitutional 
principle.  After all, the great marketplace-of-ideas principle is betrayed when corporate critics hurl 
barbs but corporations cannot speak back.  Moreover, could the First Amendment meaningfully exist 
in a capitalist culture without safeguarding corporate speech?  Accordingly, these free-speech 
advocates also saw great potential in Nike, but of an affirmative nature.  That is, they hoped the case 
would become the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan counterpart for commercial speech”). 
 
272 See generally Kerr, supra note 11. 
 
273 539 U.S. 654 (2003). 
 
274 Transcript of Oral Argument at 56, April 23, 2003, Nike, Inc. 2003 Trans. LEXIS (no. 02-575). 
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as Kasky contended or political as Nike had argued, was the critical issue 
confronting first the California courts and then the Supreme Court. 
The story of Nike v. Kasky began to take shape in the mid-1990s when Nike was 
routinely and harshly criticized for labor conditions in its foreign factories by both 
activists and in the press.  In 1993, CBS News exposed the plight of “sweatshop” 
workers in Djakarta, prompting Nike to move its operations to Vietnam.275  The 
move failed to improve Nike’s standing in the press.  Nike drew fire from New York 
Times columnist Bob Herbert and CBS’ 48 Hours.  These reports fueled more bad 
press and drew international attention from human rights activists such as Vietnam 
Labor Watch who, in 1997, issued an incriminating report about conditions in 
Nike’s factories.276   
In response, Nike launched a vigorous public relations campaign.  Among other 
things, Nike held press conferences by phone with college newspaper staffs and 
sent letters to college presidents and athletic directors assuring them that Nike was a 
socially responsible company.  Nike even hired the civil rights leader and former 
U.N. ambassador Andrew Young to visit and report on conditions in Nike’s foreign 
factories.  When Young returned with the news that Nike was doing a good job but 
that they could do better,277 Nike ran full-page editorial advertisements in major 
newspapers to report Young’s findings.278   
 
275 See Collins and Skover, supra note 90, at 969. 
 
276 Id. at 970. 
 
277 Id. at 976. 
 
278 Id. at 976. 
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Nike’s aggressive campaign caught the eye and ire of activist and California 
resident Marc Kasky who then decided to sue the footwear company for making 
false statements of fact in the course of its public relations campaign.279  To 
understand Kasky’s cause of action requires a closer look at California’s unfair 
competition law (“UCL”).  The law  
defines ‘unfair competition’ to mean and include ‘any unlawful, 
unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair deceptive, 
untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by [the false 
advertising law].’280   
 
The UCL also made it possible for Kasky to sue on behalf of the general public 
acting, in effect, as a private attorney general:   
Under this provision, a private plaintiff may bring a UCL action 
even when ‘the conduct alleged to constitute unfair competition 
violates a statute for the direct enforcement of which there is no 
private right of action.’281   
 
Kasky also sued Nike under California’s false advertising law (“FAL”) which  
makes it "unlawful for any person, ... corporation ..., or any 
employee thereof with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real 
or personal property or to perform services ... or to induce the public 
to enter into any obligation relating thereto, to make or disseminate 
... before the public in this state, ... in any newspaper or other 
publication ... or in any other manner or means whatever ... any 
statement, concerning that real or personal property or those services 
... which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by 
the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or 
misleading ...”282
 
 
279 Kasky v. Nike, 27 CAL. 4th 939 (2002) at 945. 
 
280 Id. at 948. 
 
281 CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE, section 17204; 27 CAL. 4th 939 (2002) at 950. 
 
282 CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE, section 17500; 27 CAL. 4th 939 (2002) at 950. 
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According to Kasky, Nike violated California law when it made several 
misstatements of fact about its foreign labor practices and working conditions.  In 
all, he counted seven such misstatements: 
• "workers who make NIKE Products are protected from and 
not subjected to corporal punishment and/or sexual abuse."283 
• "NIKE products are made in accordance with applicable 
governmental laws and regulations governing wages and 
hours;"284 
• "NIKE products are made in accordance with applicable laws 
and regulations governing health and safety conditions;"285 
• "NIKE pays average line-workers double-the-minimum wage 
in Southeast Asia;"286 
• "workers who produce NIKE products receive free meals and 
health care;"287 
• "the GoodWorks International (Andrew Young) report 
proves that NIKE is doing a good job and "operating 
morally';"288 
• and"NIKE guarantees a "living wage' for all workers who 
make NIKE products."289  
 
For Kasky, these statements were not opinions made in the course of an ongoing 
public debate; rather they were factual assertions that “were false and made with the 
intent of improving Nike’s financial performance.”290  In short, Kasky was accusing 
 
283 Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive Relief P 1(a), Kasky (No. 994446). 
 
284 Id. at P 1(b). 
 
285 Id. at P 1(c). 
 
286 Id. at P 1(d). 
 
287 Id. at P 1(e). 
 
288 Id. at  P 1(f). 
 
289 Id. at P 1(g). 
 
290 See Tamara R. Piety, Grounding Nike: Exposing Nike’s Quest For a Constitutional Right to Lie, 78 
Temp L.Rev. 151 (2005) at 165. 
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Nike of lying and therefore his lawsuit posed a serious threat.  If Nike lost, it would 
have to “‘disgorge all monies’” acquired as a result of its allegedly deceptive 
statements and would also have to “‘undertake a court-approved public information 
campaign’ to correct any false or misleading statements.”291
In response to the complaint, Nike filed a demurrer on grounds that the 
complaint “failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action” and that the 
relief sought was “absolutely barred by the First Amendment.”292  The trial court 
and the appeals court said the crucial issue was whether Nike’s allegedly false 
speech was “commercial or noncommercial for purposes of analyzing the 
protections afforded by the Constitution.”293  The trial court ruled that the speech 
was noncommercial and therefore sustained Nike’s demurrer without leave to 
amend.294  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Kasky appealed to the California 
Supreme Court who reversed the lower court rulings by a tight 4-3 vote. 
Justice Kennard, writing for the majority, agreed with the lower courts that 
because of the lesser degree of constitutional protection for commercial speech and 
because false commercial speech could be prohibited outright, categorizing the 
speech is crucial.295   The majority recognized however, that the Supreme Court had 
 
 
291 27 CAL. 4th 939 (2002) at 948. 
 
292 Id. at 948. 
 
293 Id. at 949. 
 
294 Id. at 949. 
 
295 Id. at 946. To determine where to place Nike’s speech, the California Supreme Court looked 
closely at the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. 463 
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not formulated “an all-purpose test to distinguish commercial from noncommercial 
speech under the First Amendment.”296  Yet, a close examination of the Supreme 
Court’s commercial speech cases, Kennard wrote, makes it “possible to formulate a 
limited-purpose test.”297  The California Supreme Court’s test—one suited for cases 
“when a court must decide whether particular speech may be subjected to laws 
aimed at preventing false advertising or other forms of commercial deception”—
required the consideration of three elements:  “the speaker, the intended audience, 
and the content of the message.”298
Under this formulation, the speaker is “someone engaged in commerce” or 
someone acting on behalf of someone so engaged.299  The intended audience is 
comprised of actual or potential customers of the speaker.300  To satisfy the final 
factor, “the factual content of the message should be commercial in character.”301  
 
U.S. 60 (1983). The California Supreme Court took particular interest in the discussion surrounding 
the problematic “informational pamphlets” that addressed the desirability of prophylactics in general.  
The majority was impressed that when the three separate factors of the Bolger test—advertising 
format, product references, and commercial motivation—were considered in isolation they did not 
make the pamphlet’s commercial speech, but that the combination of all three did.  The opinion also 
points to two important footnotes in Bolger that provide additional insight into the distinction.  First, 
the Supreme Court cautioned that the three Bolger factors do not necessarily all have to be present in 
order to categorize the speech as commercial.  Second, discussing the information pamphlets that did 
not refer specifically to the company’s own products, the high Court said “‘[t]hat a product is referred 
to generically does not, however, remove it from the realm of commercial speech.’”  In addition, the 
Bolger Court warned that “‘[a]dvertisers should not be able to immunize false or misleading product 
information from government regulation simply by including references to public issues.’”  Id. at 957.   
 
296 Id. at 968. 
 
297 Id. at 960. 
 
298 Id. at 960. 
 
299 Id. at 960. 
 
300 Id. at 960. 
 
301 Id. at 961. 
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Typically in a commercial context the speaker will make “representations of fact” 
about its “business operations, products or services” for commercial purposes.302  
The California Supreme Court drew this conclusion from a broad reading of the 
third Bolger factor—product references.  For the majority, product references 
include any number of statements about a company’s products (e.g. information 
about manufacture, distribution, warranty or repair services, etc.).  In the “context 
of a modern, sophisticated public relations campaign intended to increase sales and 
profits” this broad understanding of “product references” is necessary.303   
Applying the test to Nike’s speech, the majority concluded that the speech was 
indeed commercial for First Amendment purposes.  The opinion specifically points 
to Nike’s letters to university presidents—actual and potential buyers of Nike’s 
products—to satisfy the second element.304  Under the third factor, the majority 
found that Nike “was making factual representations about its own business 
operations” and that “Nike was in a position to readily verify the truth of any factual 
assertions made on these topics.”305   
Kasky v. Nike produced two dissenting opinions.  In his dissent, Justice Chin 
said the majority unconstitutionally handicapped one side of an important debate: 
While Nike’s critics have taken full advantage of their right to 
“uninhibited, robust, and wide open” debate, the same cannot be said 
 
 
302 Id. at 961. 
 
303 Id. at 961-962. 
 
304 Id. at 963. 
 
305 Id. at 965-966. 
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of Nike, the object of their ire.  When Nike tries to defend itself from 
these attacks, the majority denies it the same First Amendment 
protection Nike’s critics enjoy.306
 
Justice Chin also points to the Supreme Court’s decision in First National Bank 
of Boston v. Bellotti307 to show that the speaker’s corporate identity should not be a 
factor when deciding if speech is protected or not.308  Chin said the public “has the 
right to receive information from both sides of this international debate.”309  That 
Nike’s speech was allegedly false and misleading did not seem to matter much to 
Justice Chin.  He wrote that the company provided “relevant information” that 
“gave the public insight and perspective into the debate” and that such speech 
should be fully protected.310
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Brown agreed that the majority 
unconstitutionally favored one side of the debate.311  For Brown, the majority’s test 
handicaps commercial speakers and holds them “strictly liable for their false or 
misleading representations” while other speakers can make the same factual 
misrepresentations without fear of this same level of liability.312  In addition, Brown 
writes, the majority has created an overly broad test that in effect “renders all 
 
306 Id. at 970-971 (Chin, J. dissenting). 
 
307 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 
308 27 CAL. 4th 939 (2002) at 971(Chin, J. dissenting). 
 
309 Id. at 972 (Chin, J. dissenting). 
 
310 Id. at 976-977 (Chin, J. dissenting). 
 
311 Id. at 985 (Brown, J. dissenting). 
 
312 Id. at 985 (Brown, J. dissenting). 
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corporate speech commercial speech.”313  For Brown, the test will therefore 
unconstitutionally chill “a corporation’s ability to participate in the debate over 
matters of public concern.”314   
It appears that Brown finds the majority’s test problematic because it attempts 
the impossible—to make a satisfactory distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial speech when the speech contains elements of both.  According to 
Brown, as a result of the growing sophistication of strategic communication plans 
and the “growing politicization of commercial matters,” the gray area between 
commercial and noncommercial speech is getter larger,315 while the gap between 
them is shrinking.316  The Supreme Court’s commercial speech doctrine has failed 
to keep pace with these developments: 
As this gray area expands, continued adherence to the dichotomous, 
all-or-nothing approach developed by the United States Supreme 
Court will eventually lead us down one of two unappealing paths:  
either the voices of businesses in the public debate will be effectively 
silenced, or businesses will be able to dupe consumers with 
impunity.317
 
For this reason, Brown said the Supreme Court must re-evaluate the doctrine.318  
Brown calls for “a more nuanced inquiry that accounts for the realities of today’s 
 
313 Id. at 984 (Brown, J. dissenting). 
 
314 Id. at 984 (Brown, J. dissenting). 
 
315 Id. at 994 (Brown, J. dissenting). 
 
316 Id. at 979 (Brown, J. dissenting). 
 
317 Id. at 994 (Brown, J. dissenting). 
 
318 Id. at 994 (Brown, J. dissenting). 
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commercial world.”319  She suggests developing an intermediary speech category 
where “commercial and noncommercial elements are closely intertwined.”320  In 
short, the Court needs to devise an “approach that guarantees the ability of speakers 
engaged in commerce to participate in the public debate without giving these 
speakers free reign to lie and cheat.”321
This, however, is what the majority thought it was accomplishing with the 
limited-purpose test.  Justice Kennard begins the majority opinion by stating that  
[o]ur holding, based on decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court, in no way prohibits any business enterprise from speaking out 
on issues of public importance or from vigorously defending its own 
labor practices.  It means only that when a business enterprise, to 
promote and defend its sales and profits, makes factual 
representations about its own products or its own operations, it must 
speak truthfully.322
 
According to Kennard, the majority’s test leaves ample room for corporations to 
speak on public issues.  Nike, for example, is free to express an opinion on 
globalization.  That speech would be fully protected noncommercial speech.  
However, as soon as Nike makes factual statements about its own business products 
or practices, it loses that level of protection.323
 
319 Id. at 994 (Brown, J. dissenting). 
 
320 Id. at 994 (Brown, J. dissenting). 
 
321 Id. at 995 (Brown, J. dissenting). 
 
322 Id. at 946. 
 
323 Id. at 967. 
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It is important to note that the California Supreme Court never decided whether 
Nike’s commercial speech was false or not.324  This was a factual issue that needed 
to be resolved in the lower courts.  Because the decision was reversed and 
remanded to the appeals court, the case would now be allowed to enter the 
discovery phase, but not before Nike would appeal to and be granted certiorari by 
the Supreme Court. 
The challenge before Nike’s lawyers was how to craft an argument that said in 
effect that allegedly false commercial expression was entitled to First Amendment 
protection.  In response to that task, Nike’s brief, using language and rhetoric akin 
to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, argues two things.  First, it argues that its speech 
should be treated as fully protected political speech325 and second, that even if the 
California Supreme Court was correct in categorizing its speech as commercial it 
should not be subjected to the legal regime upheld by that court.326  In other words, 
it appears that Nike wanted the Court to carve out the same “breathing space” for its 
speech as the Court had done for political speech in New York Times Co. v. 
 
324 Id. at 970 (stating that “[i]n concluding, contrary to the Court of Appeals, that Nike’s speech at 
issue here is commercial speech, we do not decide whether that speech was, as plaintiff has alleged, 
false or misleading, nor do we decide whether plaintiff’s complaint is vulnerable to demurrer for 
reasons not considered here.  Because the demurrers of Nike and the individual defendants were based 
on multiple grounds, further proceedings on the demurrers may be required in the Court of Appeal, the 
superior court, or both.  Our decision on the narrow issue before us on review does not foreclose those 
proceedings”). 
 
325 See Piety, supra note 290, at 163 (“Characterizing its statements as speech on matters of public 
concern was central to Nike’s rhetorical strategy”).  
 
326 See Petitioners Brief at i, Nike Inc. (no. 02-575). 
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Sullivan.327  To this end, Nike presented itself as an “embattled citizen,”328 as a 
victim on par with civil rights leaders and lunch-counter protestors.329
According to the Petitioner’s Brief, Nike is a “voice” 330 that has been stifled by 
California’s legal regime.  If that regime is left standing, the Brief states, it “would 
chill much communication that is truthful and fully protected by any measure.”331  
Since Nike’s “voice” contributes to the “marketplace of ideas,” any limitation on it 
would severely hamper “the free exchange of ideas.”332  This, the Brief assures us 
using a well worn quote from Sullivan, strikes at the heart of the First Amendment 
and the “‘profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open.’”333  Also, the Brief argues 
based on Bellotti334 that Nike’s corporate identity is immaterial; rather the inherent 
worth of the expression is all that should be considered when deciding its 
 
327 376 U.S. 254 (1964) at 271-272 (arguing that the “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate” 
and “must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they 
need….to survive”).  See also Piety, supra note 289, at 153 (arguing “that Nike was asking for a 
constitutional right to lie”). 
 
328 See Piety, supra note 290, at 160 (writing that “Nike painted a picture of itself as an embattled 
citizen merely trying to defend itself in a public debate against an unfair attempt to stifle its voice—as 
opposed to a multi-billion dollar corporation attempting to engage in damage control and regain market 
share through the free advertising of press releases”). 
 
329 Indeed, Sullivan is invoked early in the brief with the statement that Nike responded to its critics in 
an “‘editorial advertisement’—i.e., paid political advertisements,” precisely the type of expression that 
was given full protection in Sullivan.  See Petitioners Brief at 2, Nike Inc. (no. 02-575). 
 
330 See Petitioners Brief at 2, Nike Inc. (no. 02-575) at 44. 
 
331 Id. at 38. 
 
332 Id. at 38 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809). 
 
333 Id. at 26 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254). 
 
334 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
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protection.335  In addition, the courts should not be the final arbiter of truth; rather 
the “‘best test of truth,’” the Brief states quoting Sullivan again, “‘is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.’”336  This, the 
Brief reminds us, is the central meaning and purpose of the First Amendment—a 
value given expression in Judge Learned Hand’s stirring and classic formulation 
with which the Brief ends: 
the Fist Amendment “presupposes that right conclusions are more 
likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any 
kind of authoritative selection.  To many this is, and always will be 
folly; but we have staked upon it our all.”337
 
Although the Nike brief used the language and rhetoric of New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, many commentators said it turned that ruling on its head.338  However, 
some Supreme Court Justices, perhaps moved by Nike’s argument, showed 
themselves sympathetic to Nike’s position.  Nike v. Kasky arrived on the Court’s 
docket accompanied by 31 amicus curiae briefs—the majority arguing in favor of 
Nike’s position.   Those interested were soon disappointed when the Court 
dismissed the case as improvidently granted.   
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens said there were three reasons why the 
case presented jurisdictional problems.  First, the California Court never reached a 
 
335 See Petitioners Brief at 31, Nike Inc. (no. 02-575). 
 
336 Id. at 50 (quoting Justice Brandies in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1972)). 
 
337 Id. at 50 (citing United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362,372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)). 
 
338 See, e.g., Kerr supra note 11; Piety supra note 290. 
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final judgment on the case.339  Second, “neither party has standing to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.”340  And finally, the difficulty and importance of 
the First Amendment questions raised by the case provides good reasons for not 
anticipating “a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of 
deciding it.”341
Although the justices were split on their decision to dismiss—Justices Breyer 
and O’Connor wanted to rule on the merits of the case—a majority of the Court 
rejected the Supreme Court of California’s categorization of Nike’s speech as 
unprotected commercial speech.  Justice Stevens saw the speech as “a blending of 
commercial speech, noncommercial speech and debate on an issue of public 
importance.”342  There were, Stevens wrote, two competing but important interests 
at stake.  First, the “regulatory interest in protecting market participants from being 
misled by such misstatements is of the highest order.”343  But on the other hand, 
[k]nowledgeable persons should be free to participate in such debate 
without fear of unfair reprisal.  The interest in protecting such 
participants from the chilling effect of the prospect of expensive 
litigation is therefore also a matter of great importance.344
 
 
339 Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) at 658 (Stevens, J. concurring). 
 
340 Id. at 661(Stevens, J. concurring). 
 
341 Id. at 663 (Stevens, J. concurring). 
 
342 Id. at 663 (Stevens, J. concurring). 
 
343 Id. at 664 (Stevens, J. concurring). 
 
344 Id. at 664 (Stevens, J. concurring). 
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As some commentators have noted, “[s]uch language suggests a constitutional 
mindset more akin to that of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan than of Central 
Hudson and its commercial speech progeny.”345
In dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O’Connor, said waiting to decide 
the case could exact a heavy toll on the First Amendment rights of the speaker.346  
Nike and other potential speakers, for fear of being sued under California’s unfair 
competition statute, Breyer writes, “may censor their expression well beyond what 
the law may constitutionally demand.  That is what a ‘chilling effect’ means.  It is 
present here.”347  For Breyer, this chilling effect is an affront to First Amendment 
values regardless of whether the speaker is a corporation or not.348
When the Court dismissed Nike v. Kasky for jurisdictional reasons, many 
scholars saw it as a missed opportunity for the Court to clarify its position on 
commercial speech.349  The central issue in the case, as we have seen, was the 
ever elusive definition of commercial speech,350 an especially important issue 
 
345 See Collins and Skover, supra note 90, at 1018. 
 
346 Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) at 683 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
 
347 Id. at 683 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
 
348 Id. at 684 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
 
349 See, e.g., J. Wesley Earnhardt, Comment, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky: A Golden Oppurtunity to Define 
Commercial Speech—Why Wouldn’t the Supreme Court Finally “Just Do It®”?, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 797, 
(2004); Robert O’Neil, Nike v. Kasky—What Might Have Been…, 54 Case W. Res. 1259 (2004) 
(asserting that Kasky  was “a seemingly ideal opportunity to clarify several key issues in the 
increasingly confusing doctrine of commercial speech”); James J. Barney, The Mixed Message: The 
Supreme Court’s Missed Opportunity to Address the Confused State of Commercial Speech in Nike, 
Inc. v. Kasky?, 37 U West L.A. L. Rev. 1 (2004). 
 
350 See generally Collins and Skover, supra note 90 (asserting that before Nike, commercial speech 
cases were relatively easy to sort out and therefore did not present any direct challenge to the 
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for Nike since if its speech were considered political expression it would have 
received even greater protection than its critics’ speech.351  The case also 
brought to the fore the issue of “hybrid or “mixed” speech—speech that 
contains elements of both political and commercial expression.  For some, 
Nike’s speech exemplifies the blurred line between commercial and political 
speech, a blurry and shifting line that “defies capture and definition.”352  And 
since the commercial speech doctrine has not developed a standard of review to 
exclusively evaluate this blurred, “mixed speech,”353 the Court missed that 
opportunity when it dismissed Nike.354
For others, Nike’s speech, because it contained product information aimed 
at potential consumers, clearly fell on the side of commercial speech.355  Baker, 
for example, asserts that Nike’s speech is commercial speech largely because 
for profit, non-media corporations are not entitled to the same free speech rights 
 
distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech.  Nike, for the first time, presented a case 
the directly challenged the distinction). 
 
351 See Chemerinsky and Fisk, supra note 25, at 1156. 
 
352 See La Freta, supra note 48, at 1226.  La Freta argues that the “common sense approach taken by 
the Court” leads to confusion and that “marketing and advertising are no longer necessarily identifiable 
or separable from noncommercial speech” at 1230.  
 
353 See generally Post, supra note 23. 
 
354 See generally Barney, supra note 349. 
 
355 See, e.g., Jason A. Cade, Wall Street in Turmoil: Who is Protecting the Investor?: Note: If The Shoe 
Fits Kasky v. Nike and Whether Corporate Statements About Business Operations Should Be Deemed 
Commercial Speech, 70 Brooklyn L. Rev. 247 (2004) (noting that corporations are aware that a good 
public image helps sell product and therefore “today’s commercial speech encompasses 
communications beyond traditional advertising about products or services”). 
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as flesh and blood individuals.356  In his view it is “idiocy” to treat people and 
corporations (“mere legal creations”) as beings “equally worthy of moral and 
legal concern.” 357  For Baker then, the identity of the speaker is crucial for 
determining whether the speech is commercial or not.358  The Court’s concern 
in commercial speech, after all, was never about the speaker’s right to 
expression, but about the listener’s interest in the free flow of commercial 
information.359
For proponents of Nike’s speech rights, the identity of the speaker is 
irrelevant; whether or not Nike’s speech is treated as commercial or political 
should depend entirely on the format of the expression.360  For Johnson and 
Fisher, corporate speech should only be treated as commercial when it is made 
in the course of an economic transaction. 361  On the other hand, when corporate 
speech is disseminated through media channels outside traditional advertising, it 
should be treated as political speech. 362  For example, Nike’s speech was made 
 
356 See generally C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial 
Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 Case W. Res. 1161 (2004).   
 
357 Id. at 1163. 
 
358 Id. at 1169 (arguing against Judge Brown’s dissent in Kasky in which she wrote “that the majority’s 
‘test violates fundamental principles of Fist Amendment jurisprudence by making the level of 
protection given speech dependent on the identity of the speaker—and not just the speech’s content.’”  
By contrast, Baker argues that by looking at commercial speech case law, one can only conclude that 
“commercial speech is crucially about the identity of the speaker”). 
 
359 See Baker, supra note 356, at 1170; see also Chemerinsky and Fisk, supra note 25 (when it comes 
to commercial speech, “it is the interest of the listener that’s paramount, rather than the speaker”). 
 
360 See generally Johnson and Fisher, supra note 86. 
 
361 Id. at 1245. 
 
362 Id. at 1245. 
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“to the media in the context of” a rapidly developing public debate. 363  Since a 
company does not have unlimited time to respond to its critics in this rapid-fire 
situation, it is unfair to hold it “accountable for inadvertent or negligent 
statements.” 364  Therefore, since Nike’s campaign utilized formats such as 
letters to the editor and press releases, its speech falls outside the commercial 
speech doctrine. 365
However, some argue that when Nike’s speech is examined under the 
governing Bolger test, the format becomes irrelevant.366  Attaching commercial 
speech to a public issue does not take it outside the realm of the commercial 
speech doctrine.367  Indeed, as any student of modern advertising can attest, 
focusing on format to decide the issue is problematic at best.  As one scholar 
asks, “is there any format immune from [commercial] advertising?”368  But 
others fear that disregarding format altogether and subsequently labeling all 
 
 
363 Id. at 1245. 
 
364 Id. at 1252. 
 
365 Id. at 1245. 
 
366 See, Chemerinsky and Fisk, supra note 25, at 1148. 
 
367 Id. at 1148. (writing that “[i]n  an era when corporations increasingly see news coverage as a form 
of PR, and news shows as crucial forum in their advertising and public relations campaigns, the line 
between news and advertising is blurred.  But that does not mean that the line should not or does not 
exist.  Nike’s statements where on the PR side of the line”). 
 
368 See James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment Formalism:  
Lesons from Nike v. Kasky, 54 Case W. Res. 1091 (2004) at 1120. 
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corporate speech as commercial will have a chilling effect on speech on public 
issues,369 corporate speech that has important social value.370
For the moment these issues have been left undecided and no doubt will 
continue to be debated in the academic literature.  However, it does appear that 
a majority of the Supreme Court justices rejected the categorization of Nike’s 
speech as strictly commercial.  This perhaps shows that Nike was partly 
successful in persuading the Court that its speech was similar to the speech at 
issue in Sullivan.  But was it?  Should the First Amendment protections 
provided by Sullivan be extended to Nike’s corporate speech?  In other words, 
did the California Supreme Court err in its reading of the commercial speech 
doctrine when it developed a test to determine that Nike’s speech was indeed 
commercial?  Can the First Amendment philosophy of Sullivan help address the 
difficult issues presented by Nike?  To answer, it is necessary to obtain a clear 
understanding of the type of speech Sullivan was intended to protect.  To this 
end, we turn to an examination of the philosophy and rationale of that case. 
 
369 See Vicki McIntyre, Nike v. Kasky: Leaving Corporate America Speechless, 30 Wm. Mitchell L. 
Rev. 1531 (2004) at 1565. 
 
370 See generally La Freta, supra note 48. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 SULLIVAN AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
 
 
Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote revealingly in 1968 that the Supreme Court’s 
“essential function is to act as the final arbiter of minority rights.”371 Four years 
earlier, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,372 the Court did just that and in the 
process revolutionized libel law and planted the seeds for the greater protection of 
commercial speech.  The historical context of the case is significant—Montgomery, 
Alabama at the height of the civil rights era and a minority population trying 
desperately to have its voice heard.  One of the channels open to it was advocacy 
and editorial advertising.373  In precedent-setting dicta, the Sullivan Court 
recognized such advertising as “an important outlet for the promulgation of ideas by 
persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities.”374  Yet, 
recognizing the paid advertisement “Heed Their Rising Voices” as core political 
speech was not enough to win the case for the New York Times.  The question still 
remained whether the First Amendment protected speech that contained false 
statements of fact and that allegedly defamed a public official. 
 
371 As quoted in the Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 4, 1968. 
 
372 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 
373 See Ross and Bird, supra note 18, at 266. 
 
374 376 U.S. 254 (1964) at 266. 
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Under Alabama libel law, the ad was considered “libelous per se.”375  This 
meant that if the jury found that the statements were published in the Times and 
were “of and concerning” Sullivan, the Times would be held liable 376  Once libel 
per se had been established, the Times’ only defense was to persuade the jury that 
the stated facts “were true in all their particulars.”377  The defense was unable to 
overcome this burden.   
When the case arrived before the Supreme Court, all sides agreed that some of 
the statements “were not accurate descriptions” of the events that occurred in 
Montgomery.378  The ad contained a short laundry list of minor mistakes.  Students 
sang “My Country ‘Tis of Thee” rather than the National Anthem.  The ad stated 
that nine students were expelled for leading a demonstration at the state Capitol 
when in fact they were expelled for demanding service at a lunch counter.379  
Students did not refuse to register for classes, but boycotted class on a single day.  
The dining hall was not padlocked and the police did not “ring” the campus 
although they had been deployed there three times.  And Dr. King was arrested four 
times, not seven.380
 
375 Id. at 262. 
 
376 Id. at 262. 
 
377 Id. at 267. 
 
378 Id. at 259. 
 
379 Id. at 262. 
 
380 Id. at 259. 
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Because of these misstatements of fact, Alabama law said the speakers lost their 
“privilege of ‘fair comment’” because that privilege “depends on the truth of the 
facts upon which the comment is based.”381  The question before the Supreme 
Court then was “whether this rule of liability, as applied to an action brought by a 
public official against critics of his official conduct, abridges the freedom of speech 
and of the press that is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”382
In ruling for Sullivan, the Alabama courts relied on past Supreme Court 
decisions that said in effect that libelous statements were not protected by the First 
Amendment.383  However, Justice Brennan refused to treat these cases as 
controlling because none of them “sustained the use of libel law to impose sanctions 
upon expression critical of the official conduct of public officials.”384  The only 
previous case that came near to the novel questions presented by Sullivan was left 
undecided by an equally divided court.385  Therefore, Brennan wrote,  
[i]n deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither 
precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the epithet “libel” 
than we have to other “mere labels” of state law.  Like insurrection, 
contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of peace, obscenity, 
solicitation of legal business, and the various other formulae for the 
repression of expression that have been challenged in this court, libel 
 
381 Id. at 267. 
 
382 Id. at 262. 
 
383 Id. at 268.  (citing, Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49; Times Film Corp. v. City 
of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486 -487; Beauharnais v. Illinois, 
343 U.S. 250, 266; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348-349; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 
U.S. 568,572; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715). 
 
384 Id. at 268. 
 
385 Id. at 268.  (citing Schenectady Union Pub. Co. v. Sweeney, 316 U.S. 642). 
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can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations.  It 
must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.386
 
Although the opinion certainly cites Supreme Court case law, this serves only to lay 
the groundwork for a more profound discussion of the lessons of history and the 
First Amendment principles and values on which Brennan’s argument relies.  By 
looking at the opinion’s language, these principles can be traced to an intellectual 
tradition that includes the marketplace of ideas theory387 and James Madison’s 
writings in response to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.  I argue that when 
taken in conjunction with one another, the historical justifications and the First 
Amendment principles the Court uses to arrive at its decision present a coherent 
First Amendment philosophy. 
 
Marketplace of Ideas Theory 
Brennan begins the opinion with the premise that the advertisement contains 
speech on matters of public interest.388  That such speech “is secured by the First 
Amendment,” Brennan writes, “has long been settled by our decisions.”389  In Roth 
v. United States,390 the Court said the purpose of the First Amendment was “to 
assure unfettered interchange of ideas”; to serve as a catalyst for political and social 
 
386 Id. at 269. 
 
387 J.S. Mill is quoted in footnotes 13 and 19 of the opinion. 
 
388 Id. at 266. (“The publication here was not a ‘commercial’ advertisement in the sense in which the 
word was used in Chrestensen [….]  That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as 
immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold”). 
 
389 Id. at 269. 
 
390 354 U.S. 476, 484. 
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change.391  Another case recognized free speech as “a prized American 
privilege.”392  Brennan quotes Judge Learned Hand’s Millian principle that the First 
Amendment “presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out 
of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.”393  This 
principle was echoed by Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. 
California,394 which Brennan calls the “classic formulation”: 
“Those who won our independence believed … that public 
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental 
principle of American government [….] the path of safety lies in the 
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed 
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.  
Believing in the power of reason as applied through public 
discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of 
force in its worst form.  Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of 
governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free 
speech and assembly should be guaranteed.”395
 
Justice Brennan concludes that there is a “profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open” 
and that such debate often includes “sharp attacks on government and public 
officials.”396  The question that remained was whether such speech is protected 
 
391 376 U.S. 254 (1964) at 269. 
 
392 Id. at 270 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369). 
 
393 Id. at 270 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362,372 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1943)). 
 
394 274 U.S. 357, 375-376. 
 
395 376 U.S. 254 (1964) at 270. 
 
396 Id. at 270. 
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even when it contains factual misstatements and allegedly defames a public 
official.397
To answer, Brennan quotes NAACP v. Button398 to show that constitutional 
protection is not predicated by the truthfulness, “‘popularity, or social utility’” of 
the political statement.399  In fact, Brennan writes, quoting James Madison, 
“‘[s]ome degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything; and in 
no instance is this more true than in the press.’”400  Brennan also quotes a lengthy 
passage from Cantwell v. Connecticut401 in which the Court stated that despite the 
use of exaggeration and the vilification of public officials in political discussion, the 
liberty to speak freely “‘is essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the 
part of citizens in a democracy.’”402  Indeed, the very inevitability of such 
hyperbole coupled with “‘half-truths’ and ‘misinformation’” in free debate make it 
 
397 Id. at 271. 
 
398 371 U.S. 415,445 (1963). 
 
399 376 U.S. 254 (1964) at 271. 
 
400 Id. at 270. (quoting 4 Elliot’s Debates on the Federal Constitution (1876), at 571); see also James 
Madison, The Virginia Report of 1799-1800 (De Capo Press) (1970) [178-237] (the entire quote reads: 
“Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything; and in no instance is this more 
true, than in that of the press.  It has accordingly been decided by the practice of the states, that it is 
better to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than by pruning them away, to 
injure the vigour [sic] of those yielding the proper fruits.  And can the wisdom of this policy be 
doubted by any who reflect, that to the press alone, chequered [sic] as it is with abuses, the world is 
indebted for all the triumphs which have been gained by reason and humanity, over error and 
oppression” at 222). 
 
401 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940). 
 
402 376 U.S. 254 (1964) at 271. 
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necessary to carve out “the breathing space” that free expression needs “to 
survive.”403
The language that Brennan uses and the passages he quotes in the first section 
of the opinion are traceable to the marketplace of ideas theory of free speech.  This 
theory, named after Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ spirited dissent in Abrams v. 
United States,404 assumes, in short, that in the arena of public debate, truth is not 
known beforehand; rather it emerges through the interchange of ideas.405  Many 
trace this theory to John Milton’s famous 17th century defense of unlicensed 
printing in the Areopagitica: 
Though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the 
earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and 
prohibiting to misdoubt her strength.  Let her and Falsehood grapple; 
whoever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open 
encounter?406
 
Milton believed that in the field of competing doctrines, opinions and ideas there 
was Truth to be found and that human rationality was capable of finding it.  
Although Milton’s 17th century notions of truth sound quaint to our sophisticated 
21st century ears, his self-righting principle has been influential in First Amendment 
 
403 Id. at 272. 
 
404 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J. dissenting) (1919). 
 
405 This is precisely why error and falsehood should be allowed uninhibited entry into the debate, as the 
Sullivan Court recognized when it wrote that the “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate” and 
“must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that ‘they need….to 
survive.’” 376 U.S. 254 (1964) at 272-273. 
 
406 See John Milton, Areopagitica and Of Education (George H. Sabine ed., Harlan Davidson 1987) 
(1644) at 50. 
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theory.407  Yet, before it was adopted by 20th century philosophers and judges, it 
was modified by the British philosopher John Stuart Mill. 
Mill was a little less optimistic about the power of truth when confronted with 
falsehood.  In his 1859 defense of free speech in On Liberty, Mill said history is full 
of examples of truth being “put down by persecution.”408  Yet, even though he 
recognized that truth does not always triumph over falsehood, Mill had great hope 
that truth would eventually surface in the course of history: 
The real advantage which truth has consists of this, that when an 
opinion is true, it may be extinguished once, twice, or many times, 
but in the course of the ages, there will generally be found persons to 
rediscover it, until some one of its reappearances falls on a time 
when from favorable circumstances it escapes persecution until it has 
made such head as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress 
it.409
 
For this reason, all viewpoints, and in particular dissenting viewpoints, should enjoy 
uninhibited entry into the public arena.  For Mill, the unpopular idea or opinion 
may, in the course of time, prove quite valuable.  Mill believed in the potential for 
human knowledge to grow and build upon itself.  However, this could only take 
place in an atmosphere of open and free discussion.   
In On Liberty, Mill puts forth three reasons why diversity of opinion is 
advantageous.  The first and most obvious is that the received opinion may be false 
 
407 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky and R. George Wright, Freedom of the Press: A Reference Guide to the 
United States Constitution (Praeger) (2004) at 15 (writing that “John Milton and John Stuart Mill both 
famously argued that the free exchange of ideas fosters the search for truth.  The ‘marketplace of ideas’ 
metaphor, which was introduced to First Amendment jurisprudence by Justice Oliver Wendell Holms, 
is perhaps the dominant theoretical justification for protecting freedom of expression”). 
 
408 J.S. Mill, On Liberty (Currin V. Shields ed. Macmillan 1986) (1859) at 34. 
 
409 Id. at 36. 
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and can only be corrected with an open confrontation with the correct opinion.410  
Second, if the received opinion is true and no opposing viewpoints are offered, the 
true opinion can only be accepted as dogma.  And, as Mill writes, “the received 
opinion being true, a conflict with the opposite error is essential to a clear 
apprehension and deep feeling of its truth.”411  
Mill’s third reason goes to the heart of his philosophy on human liberty and 
concerns the problematic nature of truth itself.  Mill maintained that public opinions 
were not like mathematical truths—true for all places and all times.  Rather, public 
opinion, by its nature, is such that it allows for multiple viewpoints.  In fact, for 
Mill, it was only by entertaining multiple and opposing viewpoints that publics or 
cultures or societies would ever get to anything like the truth.  For Mill, truth or 
correct public opinions are the result of a quasi-dialectical synthesis of opposing 
viewpoints: 
Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of 
the reconciling and combining of opposites that very few have minds 
sufficiently capacious and impartial to make the adjustment with an 
approach to correctness, and it has to be made by the rough process 
of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners.412
 
The dialectical nature of truth is such that opinions and ideas grow to fruition only 
through confrontation with opposing viewpoints.  For Mill, all opinions or truth-
 
410 Id. at 55. 
 
411 Id. at 55.  Mill writes that “the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is 
robbing the human race, posterity as well as the existing generation—those who dissent from the 
opinion still more than those who hold it.  If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity 
of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer 
perception and livelier impression of truth produced by is collision with error.”  Id at 21. 
 
412 Id. at 58. 
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claims are partially true and therefore dependent on one another.413  When one 
truth-claim is synthesized with its opposite, what emerges is a truth-claim that is 
truer than either of the previous truth-claims.414  Mill suggests then, that human 
knowledge grows and builds upon itself as a result of the continuing synthesis of 
opposing truth-claims and that this synthesis is fostered “through diversity of 
opinion.”415
Mill strongly asserted the fallibility of the human mind and that human 
knowledge is never complete.  For this reason, no person is in a position to decide 
for others what is truthful or certain.416  As Mill writes, “[a]ll silencing of 
discussion is an assumption of infallibility.”417  Indeed, silencing opinion decides in 
advance for others the correct answer to any question and does not allow others the 
same opportunity to examine all sides of the argument.418  Since no person or 
government is in a position to make these decisions, and because each person 
should have the opportunity to decide for him or herself, the free flow of 
information is necessary.  In addition, since it is only by receiving and entertaining 
all sides of the debate that one can ever come to know the truth, Mill asserts a 
speaker’s right to engage in the discussion and a listener’s right to hear all available 
 
413 Id. at 58. 
 
414 Id. at 44.  (“But on every subject on which difference of opinion is possible, the truth depends on a 
balance to be struck between two sets of conflicting reasons”). 
 
415 Id. at 58. 
 
416 Id. at 29. 
 
417 Id. at 21-22. 
 
418 Id. at 29. 
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sides.419  Neither popular majorities nor governments have the right to censor 
unpopular opinion, whether these opinions are true or false; rather public opinions 
are inherently valuable and should be voiced and heard by all who wish to do so. 
Mill’s ideas in On Liberty have been influential in American political thought.  
The American pragmatist John Dewey incorporated Mill’s insights into his early 
20th century political philosophy of communication.  Dewey’s ideal democracy is a 
multi-dimensional society fostered by the interaction between diverse people and 
groups.420  Dewey said democracy is “more than a form of government; it is 
primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience.”421  
For Dewey, communication is a precondition and the very foundation of democratic 
society; it provides a link to critical perspectives on culture and opens a space for 
the questioning and critique of political and economic structures.422  The status quo, 
in such a democracy, is fluid and is under constant revision due to the import of 
different viewpoints.  Deweyan democratic society views individual and group 
variations to the status quo as the engine of social progress.  At the same time, such 
 
419 Id. at 45.  For Mill, it is not enough to just hear a version of the opposing argument; rather one 
should be exposed to the argument by one who believes it.  The listener “must know [the argument] in 
[its] most plausible and persuasive form.” 
 
420 See John Dewey, Democracy and Education: The Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (The 
Free Press) (1967). 
 
421 Id. at 87. 
 
422 For a brief discussion on the critical perspective of John Dewey see Hanno Hardt, Contemplating 
Marxism—and Other Theoretical Challenges.  Interactions: Critical Studies in Communication, Media, 
& Journalism (Rowman & Littlefield) (1998). 
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a community is bounded by common goals, interests and the cooperative and free 
interchange of ideas.423
Dewey seems to adopt Mill’s insight into the dialectical nature of human 
communication.  For both Dewey and Mill, intellectual and social progress is the 
outcome of a synthesis of opposing viewpoints.  When the free interchange of ideas 
occurs, truth develops and progresses.  Truth in this sense is ever-changing.  Thus, 
we discover in the philosophies of both Dewey and Mill an assumption about the 
nature of truth that is grounded in the philosophical doctrine of fallibilism, or the 
belief that knowledge is imperfect and that there is always a degree of uncertainty 
in any truth-claim. 424
This philosophical outlook was shared by another early 20th century writer who 
had a more direct influence on the Sullivan Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.  
Holmes, like his contemporary Dewey, believed that human knowledge was fallible 
and could at best produce only provisional knowledge.  Like Dewey, he also 
believed that such provisional knowledge was best obtained through the free 
interchange of ideas.  Holmes’ famous marketplace of ideas passage in his 
dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States synthesized a lot of the free speech 
philosophy that came before: 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly 
logical.  If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and 
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your 
 
423 Id.  
 
424 This doctrine is most closely associated with the American philosopher C.S. Peirce.  Simply put, 
fallibilism “maintains that our scientific knowledge-claims are invariably vulnerable and turn out to be 
false” (The Oxford Companion to Philosophy). 
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wishes in law and sweep away all opposition [….]  But when men 
have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may 
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of 
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by 
free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of thought 
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth 
is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.  
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.  It is an 
experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day 
we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon 
imperfect knowledge.425
 
The passage sounds many of the themes and ideas prevalent in the philosophies of 
Mill and Dewey concerning free speech.  Opinions and truth claims are fallible.  
Human knowledge is imperfect and therefore open-ended.  For this reason, ideas 
need to be traded freely.  The passage also seems to echo Milton and Mill’s hope 
that truth will eventually triumph in the marketplace of ideas. 
With the support of marketplace theory, the Court decided that neither 
falsehood nor defamatory content removes “the constitutional shield from criticism 
of official conduct.”426  However, the question remained whether the First 
Amendment protected speech that contained a combination of these elements.427  
To answer, Brennan turns to the lessons of history, in particular the controversial 
debates surrounding the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.  And in doing so, arrives 
at what he calls the “central meaning of the First Amendment.”428
 
 
425 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J. dissenting) (1919) at 630. 
 
426 376 U.S. 254 at 273. 
 
427 Id. at 273. 
 
428 Id. at 274. 
 
  91
                                                
The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 
When Federalist John Adams became the second president of the United States, 
he inherited strained relations with France.  Because of mounting tensions between 
the two countries, Adams called a special session of Congress in May of 1797 and 
asked for increased military spending.  Thomas Jefferson, Adams’ vice president 
and leader of the Republican opposition, interpreted Adams’ request as a call for 
war.429  Whether or not this was Adams’ intent, his requests were denied.  More 
importantly however, the moment signaled a growing political and ideological rift 
between Adams and Jefferson.   
Adams next tried a diplomatic track.  He sent envoys to France to negotiate an 
amity treaty, which resulted in the notorious XYZ affair.  The French foreign 
minister Talleyrand not only refused the American delegation but sent three French 
operatives, known as XYZ, to demand a bribe as a prerequisite for dealing with the 
Americans.  American popular reaction to the affair produced a wave of hostility 
toward France and its supporters, among them Jefferson.  The event touched off a 
war of words in Federalist and Republican newspapers. 
Jefferson, roundly attacked in the Federalist press, aired his own bad feelings 
about Adams and the Federalists in the Republican press, characterizing them as 
“‘an Anglican, monarchical and aristocratic party.’”430  The rift between party lines 
deepened and Republic opposition grew more intense as Adams’ presidency 
 
429 See Joseph M. Lynch, Negotiating the Constitution:  The Earliest Debates over Original Intent 
(Cornell University Press) (1999). 
 
430 Id. at 167. 
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progressed.  Republicans tried to take advantage of the loss of the popular George 
Washington as the Federalist leader; their hope was that with Washington gone they 
could paint the party with the broad brush of corruption.431
This was the background against which the Federalist-controlled Congress 
passed four pieces of legislation in the summer of 1798 known as the Alien and 
Sedition Acts.   As Joseph Ellis points out in Founding Brothers, those statutes 
“were designed to deport or disenfranchise foreign born residents, mostly 
Frenchmen, who were disposed to support the Republican Party.”432  The Acts also 
aimed at silencing the Republican opposition.433  To this end, Congress passed 
section two, the Sedition Act, which contained language aimed directly at freedom 
of expression: 
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That if any person shall write, 
print, utter or publish, or shall cause or procure to be written, printed, 
uttered or published, or shall knowingly and willingly assist or aid in 
writing, printing, uttering or publishing any false, scandalous and 
malicious writing or writings against the government of the United 
States, or either House of the Congress of the United States, or the 
President of the United States, with intent to defame the said 
government, or either House of the said Congress, or the said 
President, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or 
disrepute; or to excite against them, or either or any of them, the 
hatred of the good people of the United States, or to excite any 
unlawful combinations therein, for opposing or resisting any law of 
the United States, or any act of the President of the United States, 
done in pursuance of any such law, or of the powers in him vested by 
the Constitution of the United States, or to resist, oppose, or defeat 
 
431 Id. at 169. 
 
432 See Joseph J. Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation (Alfred A. Knopf) (2000) at 
190. 
 
433 See Lynch, supra note 429, at 186 (writing that when the Acts were debated in the House, “the 
Federalist speaker made clear at the outset that the bill was directed primarily at Republicans”).   
 
  93
                                                
any such law or act, or to aid, encourage or abet any hostile designs 
of any foreign nation against the United States, their people or 
Government, then such persons, being thereof convicted before any 
court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall be 
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by 
imprisonment not exceeding two years.434
 
The broad language against criticism of the government served its intended 
purpose.  Prominent Republicans and newspapermen were tried and convicted in 
sedition proceedings.  The Acts, however, proved a political disaster for Adams and 
the Federalists, who ultimately lost the presidency of 1800 to Jefferson.  The Acts 
also provoked the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions authored by Jefferson and 
James Madison respectively.  Madison’s response to the Acts played an especially 
important role in Brennan’s Sullivan opinion.   
In Make No Law, Anthony Lewis said Brennan “did something quite 
extraordinary [when he] held unconstitutional an act of Congress that had expired 
one hundred and sixty-three years before.”435  Brennan wrote that even though the 
act was never challenged in the Supreme Court, “the attack upon its validity has 
carried the day in the court of history.”436  The debate surrounding the Alien and 
Sedition Acts allowed Brennan to fashion a narrower view of the First Amendment 
than that provided by the marketplace of ideas theory.  Following the marketplace 
 
434 See Juhani Rudanko, The Forging of Freedom of Speech (University Press of American) (2003) at 
60. 
 
435 See Anthony Lewis, Make No Law:  The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment (Random House) 
(1991) at 145. 
 
436 Id. at 276. (“The invalidity of the Act has also been assumed by Justices of this Court.  See Holmes, 
J., dissenting and joined by Brandeis, J., in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630; Jackson, J., 
dissenting in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 288-289 [….]  These views reflect the broad 
consensus that the Act, because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and public 
officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment”). 
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theory, it would seem as if all speech, regardless of content or original intent, 
should enjoy free, uninhibited entry into the public arena.  However, the “lessons of 
history” cited in the opinion presents a First Amendment that privileges speech vital 
to republican forms of government.  In this view, the First Amendment is intended 
to protect speech that provides citizens with the information they need to be free 
and self-governing. 
To this end, Brennan cites a key passage from the Virginia Resolutions of 1798 
in which Madison states that the Alien and Sedition Act 
exercises… a power not delegated by the Constitution, but, on the 
contrary, expressly and positively forbidden by one of the 
amendments thereto—a power which, more than any other, ought to 
produce universal alarm, because it is leveled against the right of 
freely examining public characters and measures, and of free 
communication among the people thereon, which has ever been 
justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other right.437  
 
For Madison, that the right to freely speak and thereby criticize governing officials 
is “the guardian of every other right,” is due to the very nature of republican 
governments in which the power is intended to reside with the people.438   
In the Virginia Report Madison distinguishes between the British and American 
forms of government.  In a monarchical system, the government is led by a 
hereditary king.  The king is sovereign and the people are his subjects.  The king is 
considered an infallible ruler who answers only to himself.  By contrast, in the 
American system, the people are sovereign and their elected officials are considered 
 
437 Id. at 275. 
 
438 See James Madison, The Virginia Report of 1799-1800 (De Capo Press) (1970) [178-237] (writing 
“[t]he people, not the government, posses the absolute sovereignty” at 220). 
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both fallible and accountable to them.  Madison asked, “[i]s it not natural and 
necessary, under such different circumstances, that a different degree of freedom in 
the use of the press should be contemplated?”439   
Thus, the very form and structure of republican government determines, for 
Madison, the level of free speech that should be accorded the citizens and by 
extension, the press.  In a republican government the character of public officials 
needs to be examined so that citizens can make wise political decisions.  This 
examination cannot take place without a free press.  As Madison writes,  
[l]et it be recollected […] that the right of electing the members of 
the government, constitutes more particularly the essence of a free 
and responsible government.  The value and efficacy of this right, 
depends on the knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits 
of the candidates for public trust; and on the equal freedom, 
consequently, of examining and discussing these merits and 
demerits of the candidates respectively.440
 
To understand the importance of a free press and the perniciousness of any law 
that places restraints on it, one need only look at the history of the American 
founding.  Madison writes,  
[h]ad “sedition-acts,” forbidding every publication that might bring 
the constituted agents into contempt or disrepute, or that might 
excite the hatred of the people against the authors of unjust or 
pernicious measures, been uniformly enforced against the press, 
might not the United States have been languishing at this day, 
under the infirmities of a sickly confederation?  Might they not 
possibly be miserable colonies, groaning under a foreign yoke?441  
 
 
439  Id. at 221. 
 
440 Id. at 227. 
 
441 Id. at 222. 
 
  96
                                                
 This was perhaps on the minds of many during the discussions that led to the final 
drafting and ratification of the Constitution.  Indeed, many feared that the powers 
granted to Congress under the necessary and proper clause could be used to silence 
the press and limit other rights.442  For this reason, many urged the adoption of a 
bill of rights that would guarantee limits on the powers of Congress.   
For Madison, the original meaning of the First Amendment was to protect 
speech and the press precisely from laws like those under the Sedition Act.  Indeed, 
the Constitution, according to Madison, absolutely forbids the abridgment of speech 
that examines “public characters and measures,” even speech that defames public 
officials: 
Is then the federal government, it will be asked, destitute of every 
authority for restraining the licentiousness of the press, and for 
shielding itself against the libellous [sic] attacks which may be 
made on those who administer it? 
The Constitution alone can answer this question.  If no such power 
be expressly delegated, and it be not both necessary and proper to 
carry into execution an express power; above all, if it be expressly 
forbidden by a declaratory amendment to the Constitution, the 
answer must be, that the federal government is destitute of all 
authority.443  
  
Clearly then, for Madison, the primary purpose of the First Amendment is to protect 
the citizen’s right to criticize government and other forms of concentrated power.  
This, I would argue, is the central tenet of the First Amendment philosophy adopted 
by the Sullivan Court. 
 
442 Id. at 222. 
 
443 Id. at 224. 
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L.B. Sullivan was an elected official who brought suit against “critics of his 
official conduct.”444  These critics were four individual petitioners and, because 
they published the criticism, the New York Times.  In writing the opinion, Justice 
Brennen noted that the petitioners were “Negroes [sic] and Alabama clergymen” 
who supported a movement that was fighting for “‘the right to live in human dignity 
as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights.’”445  The Court also 
noted the non-profit nature of the ad which sought financial support for three 
purposes:  “support of the student movement, ‘the struggle for the right-to-vote,’ 
and the legal defense of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.”446   
The Sullivan Court clearly wanted to protect “expression critical of the official 
conduct of public officials.”447  Indeed, the opinion states that the primary purpose 
of the First Amendment is to protect the “citizen-critic” and notes that it is “as much 
[the critic’s] duty to criticize as it is the official’s duty to administer.”448  Therefore, 
the criticism’s appearance in a paid editorial advertisement does not change what it 
is—core First Amendment speech.  Indeed, the Court found that, despite several 
factual inaccuracies, the advertorial “Heed Their Rising Voices” was exactly the 
 
444 376 U.S. 254 at 256. 
 
445 Id. at 256. 
 
446 Id. at 257.  The ad also criticized the power structure of the South as evidenced by the response 
toward the civil rights movement. The ad said the student movement and other civil rights protests in 
the South had been “met by an unprecedented wave of terror by those who would deny and negate that 
document [the U.S. Constitution] which the whole world looks upon as setting the pattern for modern 
freedom.”  The ad criticized “southern violators” which purportedly included any powerful groups or 
person who had responded to the movement with “intimidation and violence.” 
 
447 Id. at 268. 
 
448 Id. at 282. 
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type of speech the framers must have had in mind when penning the First 
Amendment.  It was speech that  
communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, 
protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of 
a movement whose existence and objectives [were] matters of the 
highest public interest and concern.449
 
 
Sullivan’s First Amendment Philosophy 
The present chapter attempts to delineate a coherent First Amendment 
philosophy from the text of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.  According to 
Weinstein, there are three basic values underlying American free speech doctrine:  
democratic self-governance, the search for truth, and non-instrumental values such 
as individual self-fulfillment.450  An emphasis on the first two values is prevalent in 
Sullivan.   
The opinion first relies on the search for truth or the marketplace of ideas theory 
in order to justify protection for political speech that contains misstatements of fact.  
This theory assumes that truth or correct opinion is best achieved in an environment 
in which multiple and competing viewpoints, opinions and ideas are interchanged 
freely.  Thus, “debate on public issues,” the Court concludes, “should be 
uninhibited, robust and wide-open.”451  This libertarian view of speech is then 
tempered by a discussion of the Alien and Sedition Acts, the result of which 
 
449 Id. at 266. 
 
450 See James Weinstein, Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Radical Attack on Free Speech Doctrine 
(Westview Press) (1999) at 13. 
 
451 376 U.S. 254 (1964) at 270. 
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justifies protection for political speech that contains both falsehoods and allegedly 
defames a public official.  The theory that emerges from this discussion emphasizes 
republican values and goals rather than individual rights.  Although marketplace 
theory goes a step beyond the political realm to include vast areas of human 
knowledge, both “justify free speech instrumentally, that is, in terms of the good it 
produces for society as a whole.”452  On this basis, the Sullivan Court concludes 
that since the speech in question is about “matters of the highest public interest and 
concern,” it deserves full First Amendment protection.   
However, the opinion also seems to emphasize that the core speech protected by 
Sullivan—political speech by the “citizen critic” aimed at governing officials—is 
more than just beneficial to society, it is necessary for the survival of the American 
republic.  As Thomas Emerson points out, “[t]he crucial point…is not that freedom 
of expression is politically useful, but that it is indispensable to the operation of a 
democratic form of government.”453  This, I would argue, is the reason Brennan 
discovers the central meaning and purpose of the First Amendment in the 
controversy surrounding the Alien and Sedition Acts.  It should also be noted that 
under this theory “speech matters more for the audience than for the speaker.  We 
value speech because it’s a way of educating the sovereign assembly.”454  This 
 
452 Id. at 13. 
 
453 See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment in The First 
Amendment: A Reader (West Publishing) (1992) at 52. 
 
454 Id. at 52. 
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Meiklejohnian view of free speech assumes that the necessity of free speech springs 
from the very nature of republican government.455
On the whole, the First Amendment philosophy of Sullivan is grounded in the 
democratic self-governance theory.  Therefore the discussion of marketplace theory 
should be understood in that context.  The opinion suggests then, that only certain 
types of speech (i.e. core political speech) should enjoy free, uninhibited entry into 
the arena of public debate.  In addition, in both Mill and Madison, the emphasis is 
on how freedom of speech serves the interests of the community.  We must keep 
this in mind as we turn to a discussion of the values that guide the commercial 
speech doctrine.  
 
455 See generally Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom in The First Amendment: A Reader (West 
Publishing) (1992). 
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CHAPTER 7 
SULLIVAN’S FIRST AMENDMENT PHILOSOPHY AND THE 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE 
 
 
 
The predominant rationale of Sullivan, that speech on matters of public interest 
should enjoy free, uninhibited entry into the public arena, can be seen at work in the 
Court’s commercial speech cases of the mid-1970s.  In both Bigelow and Virginia 
Pharmacy, the Court decided that commercial information can be of great public 
interest.  For this reason, the Court concluded that the free flow of commercial 
information is vital to the decision-making public and therefore warrants First 
Amendment protection.  However, the Court strayed from this rationale when it 
introduced the Central Hudson balancing test.  The test began an era of confusion 
that saw the Court vacillating between protecting commercial speech on the one 
hand and deferring to government regulations on the other.  This confusion was 
forestalled quite a bit through a series of 1990s “vice” cases in which the return to 
the rationale of Virginia Pharmacy was urged by some of the Justices.  This chapter 
begins by highlighting the connection between self-governance theory and speech 
on public issues.  It then traces the theory’s impact on the modern commercial 
speech doctrine.  The chapter closes by assessing the California Supreme Court’s 
handling of Kasky v. Nike in light of the recent changes in the modern commercial 
speech doctrine.   
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As Estlund points out, the Court “has declared that ‘speech concerning public 
affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-governance.’”456  And 
among the most celebrated cases that adheres to this declaration is New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan.457  According to Estlund, the Sullivan Court “followed a well-worn 
path” when it recognized public interest speech as a central First Amendment 
concern.458  Protecting speech on public issues has led to a broader conception of 
the First Amendment and as a result commercial and corporate speakers have 
benefited greatly.459  Indeed, the granting of greater protection for commercial 
speech in Virginia Pharmacy and for corporate speech in Bellotti and Consolidated 
Edison “originated in part to protect messages of political and social 
significance.”460
But who decides what is of political or social significance?  To answer is to 
recognize the peculiar nature of speech on matters of public concern and its 
theoretical dependence on democratic self-governance.  Self-governance theory 
rests on the assumption of popular sovereignty; that speech that informs and 
educates the decision-making public is central to a democratic form of government.  
Taking the idea of popular sovereignty to its logical end, it must be concluded that 
 
456 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First 
Amendment Category, 59 Geo Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1990) at 1 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
64, 74-75 (1964)). 
 
457 Id. at 13. 
 
458 Id. at 14. 
 
459 Id. at 15. 
 
460 Id. at 19-20. 
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it is the sovereign or the public who decides what messages have political or social 
significance.  For this reason, it is impossible to determine in advance what should 
be included in this category of speech.  As Estlund writes,  
Democratic self-governance posits that the people control the 
agenda of government.  They have the power to determine the 
content of public issues simply by the direction of their interests.  
This means that every issue that can potentially agitate the public 
is also potentially relevant to democratic self-governance, and 
hence potentially for public concern.461
 
The Court recognized this in Consolidated Edison, stating that “[t]o allow a 
government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow 
that government control over the search for political truth.”462  And the Court also 
recognized this at the beginning stage of the modern commercial speech doctrine.  
As can be seen in Bigelow and then in Virginia Pharmacy, self-governance theory 
helped bring an end to the categorical exclusion of commercial speech from First 
Amendment protection.463   
Highlighting the informational value of Bigelow’s advertisement, Justice 
Blackmun said the ad “contained factual material of clear ‘public interest’ [and that 
 
461 Id. at 30 (drawing heavily on Robert Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: 
Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 
603, 667-79 (1990)).  This is precisely why some commentators find the Connick v. Myers public 
concern test problematic.  As Estlund writes, “[t]he theoretical underpinnings of the public concern test 
lie in the widely shared view that the First Amendment is particularly concerned with speech that is 
relevant to the process of self-governance.  Yet the very concept of a circumscribed category of speech 
on matters of public concern applied on a case-by-case basis by the judiciary is at odds with basic 
tenets of democratic self-governance.  As Professor Robert Post recently wrote, any normative or 
prescriptive conception of matters of public concern ‘would lead directly to doctrinal impasse’”). 
 
462 447 U.S. 530 (1980) at 538. 
 
463 See Estlund, supra note 456, at 20. 
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it] conveyed information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience.”464  
For Blackmun, the Virginia statute clearly violated a First Amendment that is 
supposed to foster the “dissemination of information and opinion.”465  The First 
Amendment, Blackmun writes, does not only protect against press censorship, but 
against “‘any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such 
free and general discussion of public matters.’”466   
One year after Bigelow, when formally introducing commercial speech under 
the aegis of the First Amendment, Blackmun once again capitalized on the language 
of self-governance theory.  Early in the opinion, Blackmun cites several cases that 
point to “a First Amendment right to ‘receive information and ideas,’ and that the 
freedom of speech ‘necessarily protects the right to receive.””467  Blackmun points 
out that information and ideas that concern a matter of public interest are often 
embedded within speech that “does ‘no more than propose a commercial 
transaction.’”468  Blackmun notes that some people may be more interested in 
commercial information than in political speech.469  Commercial information may 
also contain matters of a more general public interest as in, for example, Bigelow’s 
 
464 421 U.S. 809 (1975) at 822. 
 
465 Id. at 829. 
 
466 Id. at 829 (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,150 (1967)). 
 
467 425 U.S. 748 (1976) at 756 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-763 (1972)).   
 
468 Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) at 
385). 
 
469 425 U.S. 748 (1976) at 764. 
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advertisement for abortion services.470  For Blackmun, the free flow of commercial 
information contributes to a better informed citizenry.  As Blackmun writes, “even 
if the First Amendment were thought primarily an instrument to enlighten public 
decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information 
does not serve that goal.”471   
According to Blackmun, Virginia’s ban on prescription drug price advertising 
attempted to protect citizens by keeping them in ignorance.472  He therefore offers 
“an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach” one that would not only be less 
offensive to the First Amendment, but that is also in line with the ideal of popular 
sovereignty.473  For Blackmun, information is not in itself harmful; “people will 
perceive their own interest if only they are well informed, and that the best means to 
that end is to open the channels of communication rather than close them.”474  The 
first principle of American republican government, as recognized here by 
Blackmun, is the belief that the people have the capacity to make wise decisions 
when provided with the necessary information.  For this reason, the courts and the 
government have no choice but to allow the dissemination of truthful commercial 
speech.  There is no alternative between “suppressing information” on the one hand 
 
470 Id. at 764. 
 
471 Id. at 766. 
 
472 Id. at 769. 
 
473 Id. at 770. 
 
474 Id. at 770. 
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and “the dangers of its misuse if freely available” on the other.475   “It is precisely 
this kind of choice,” Blackmun writes, “that the First Amendment makes for us.”476   
This, however, does not rule out the regulation of commercial speech altogether.  
Time, place and manner restrictions on commercial speech, like other varieties of 
protected speech, are permissible.477  Also, false and misleading speech or speech 
about an unlawful activity or product can be completely suppressed.  “The First 
Amendment,” Blackmun writes, “does not prohibit the State from insuring that the 
stream of commercial information flows cleanly as well as freely.”478
So we see then, that in Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy Blackmun justified 
commercial speech protection in language that invoked democratic self-governance 
theory.  It was recognized that commercial speech can include matters of public 
interest and, in true Madisonian self-governance fashion, that it is up to the public, 
not the government, to decide what is of interest.  This became the controlling 
rationale in commercial speech cases leading up to Central Hudson.   
Beginning with Central Hudson, the Court veered away from the self-
governance rationale of Virginia Pharmacy and began to focus more on the ways in 
which government can regulate commercial speech.  Absent from the Central 
 
475 Id. at 770. 
 
476 Id. at 770. 
 
477 Id. at 771. (citing the O’Brien Test and writing that “[w]e have often approved restrictions of that 
kind provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they 
serve a significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of information”). 
 
478 Id. at 772. 
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Hudson opinion are any extended analyses of the reasons for commercial speech 
protection that characterized earlier cases.  In its place are a few lines citing 
Virginia Pharmacy’s assertion that because commercial speech furthers the social 
interest in disseminated information, unwarranted “governmental regulation” is 
barred by the First Amendment.479  The extent to which governments may regulate 
commercial speech is the subject of the opinion.   
According to Justice Powell, governments can place greater restrictions on 
commercial speech than other types of protected speech because the Court has long 
recognized a “common-sense” distinction between the two.480  The level of 
protection granted commercial speech “turns on the nature both of the expression 
and of the governmental interest served by the regulation.”481  This interesting line, 
devoid of any reference to past cases, introduces into the commercial speech 
doctrine a balancing test.  This test goes beyond the reasons for placing restrictions 
on commercial speech as laid out in Virginia Pharmacy.  In addition to banning 
false and misleading commercial speech, it could be now be regulated if the state 
could show a substantial interest in doing so and if the restriction was narrowly 
tailored.482   
 
479 447 U.S. 557 (1980) at 562. 
 
480 Id. at 563. 
 
481 Id. at 564. 
 
482 Id. at 563-564. 
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The precedent for the test is provided by five cases from the late 1970s.483  
Powell discovers about seven lines from these decisions that holds open the 
possibility of allowing restrictions that go beyond ensuring a fair bargaining 
process.  For example, Powell cites Carey v. Population Services International in 
which the Court “held that the State’s ‘arguments…do not justify the total 
suppression of advertising concerning contraceptives.’”484  For Powell, “[t]his 
holding left open the possibility that the state could implement more carefully 
drawn restrictions.”485  It appears then, that “the four-part analysis” that has 
developed over three terms worth of commercial speech cases is derived as much 
from what was not said in those cases as from what was.  For Justice Blackmun, the 
majority’s interpretation of past commercial speech cases, and its introduction of a 
balancing test based on that interpretation, was a departure from the rationale the 
justified commercial speech protection in the first place. 
Blackmun concurred in judgment only and said  
the test now evolved and applied by the Court is not consistent 
with our prior cases and does not provide adequate protection for 
truthful, nonmisleading, noncoercive commercial speech.486
   
Blackmun argues that the Court’s intermediate level test is appropriate for false or 
misleading speech or for time, place and manner restrictions, but that it is improper 
 
483  These cases include Virginia Pharmacy (1976), Bates (1977), Bellotti (1978), Carey v. Population 
Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) and In re Primus, 435 U.S. 412, 438 (1978). 
 
484447 U.S. 557 (1980) at 566. 
 
485 Id. at 566. 
 
486 447 U.S. 557 (1980) at 573 (Blackmun, J. concurring). 
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to apply it to a regulation that “seeks to suppress information about a product in 
order to manipulate a private economic decision that the State cannot or has not 
regulated or outlawed directly.”487  Such attempts to dampen demand by regulating 
commercial information “strikes at the heart of the First Amendment” because  
it is a covert attempt by the State to manipulate the choices of its 
citizens, not by persuasion or direct regulation, but by depriving 
the public of the information needed to make a free choice.488   
 
According to Blackmun, the rationale of Central Hudson was unlike that of any of 
the Court’s previous commercial speech cases.  For example, Blackmun says the 
Virginia Pharmacy Court did not examine the state’s interest to see if they were 
substantial.  If they did, Blackmun writes, they would have found “legitimate and 
important state goals.”489  Nor did the Virginia Pharmacy Court apply or ask 
questions even remotely close to those addressed in Central Hudson; rather, the 
Court “held that the State ‘may not [pursue its goals] by keeping the public in 
ignorance.’”490  Up until Central Hudson, Blackmun writes, “this principle has 
governed.”491   
 
487 Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J. concurring). 
 
488Id. at 574-575 (Blackmun, J. concurring). 
 
489 Id. at 576 (Blackmun, J. concurring). 
 
490 Id. at 576 (Blackmun, J. concurring). 
 
491 Id. at 577 (Blackmun, J. concurring).  Blackmun also attacks the basis of the Court’s rationale, the 
“common-sense” distinction between commercial and other types of protected speech:  “We have not 
suggested that the ‘common-sense’ differences between commercial speech and other speech justify 
relaxed scrutiny of restraints that suppress truthful, nondeceptive, noncoercive commercial speech […] 
No differences between commercial speech and other protected speech justify suppression of 
commercial speech in order to influence public conduct through manipulation of the availability of 
information.” 
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Some critics agree with Blackmun that the Central Hudson test signaled a 
departure from the governing principles of Virginia Pharmacy; that the rationale for 
protecting commercial speech was replaced by a test that balanced the state’s 
interests against the First Amendment interest in the free flow of information.492  
According to Costello, when the Central Hudson majority neglected “to explore 
why commercial speech deserve[d] protection” and instead showed “how that 
protection should be applied,” it left the Supreme Court and the lower courts “with 
a test that could be manipulated to come to whatever result a judge or court 
desired.”493  For this reason, commercial speech cases in which the Court showed 
deference to government regulations that had nothing to do with ensuring a fair 
bargaining process, such as Posadas and Edge, can be seen as natural outgrowths of 
Central Hudson.   
Predictably then, by Posadas and later Edge, the original rationale for protecting 
commercial speech seemed completely forgotten and was replaced by Central 
Hudson analysis.494  Central Hudson was a departure not only from the rationale of 
Virginia Pharmacy but, as Costello points out, a departure from any theory 
justifying protection for commercial speech:  “after Central Hudson, [.… i]t was as 
if the Court felt there was no need to state the reasons for its doctrine once it had a 
 
492 See, e.g., Sean P. Costello, Strange Brew: The State of Commercial Speech Jurisprudence Before 
and After 44 Liqourmart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 47 Case W. Res. 681 (2000). 
 
493 Id. at 700. 
 
494 For example, in Posadas the only rationale other than the test is the greater-includes-the-lesser 
rationale used to distinguish between the ad at issue in the present case and the ad in Bigelow.   
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ready-made test in hand for disposing of the cases coming before it.”495  This 
remained the pattern until the commercial speech doctrine underwent another 
change in direction in the mid-1990s. 
It was shown earlier that in the 1990s “vice” cases, 496 Rubin v. Coors, 44 
Liqourmart, and Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, that Central Hudson analysis 
was strengthened and became a formidable challenge to regulations on commercial 
speech.  It was also recognized that these cases reversed the earlier trend, seen in 
Posadas and Edge, toward deference to state governments and their asserted 
interests.  Although Central Hudson was upheld and continued to be used in the 
“vice” cases, Justices Stevens and Thomas expressed varying degrees of 
dissatisfaction with the test and in doing so called for a return to the self-
governance rationale of Virginia Pharmacy.   
The first sign of the attack on Central Hudson came from Justice Stevens’ 
concurrence in Rubin v. Coors.  As was seen earlier, Stevens said the Court’s 
reliance on Central Hudson was a “misguided” approach that made the “case 
appear more difficult than it” was.497  Stevens then noted the difference between 
Central Hudson and the reasons for allowing more regulation of commercial speech 
than other speech as set forth in Virginia Pharmacy.  The only reasons the Virginia 
Pharmacy Court allowed greater restriction was to ensure that consumers were not 
 
495 See Costello, supra note 492, at 740-741. 
 
496 See, e.g., Langvardt, supra note 74 (arguing that these cases represent the incremental strengthening 
of First Amendment protection for commercial speech). 
 
497 514 U.S. 476 (1995) at 493 (Stevens, J. concurring). 
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mislead and because commercial speech was more verifiable than political 
speech.498  Regulations therefore should only be aimed at false and misleading 
speech; any other motives tend toward the paternalistic and are therefore not in the 
spirit of Virginia Pharmacy.499  In language reminiscent of Blackmun’s Central 
Hudson concurrence, Steven’s writes,   
[a]ny “interest” in restricting the flow of accurate information 
because of the perceived danger of that knowledge is anathema to 
the First Amendment; more speech and a better informed citizenry 
are among the central goals of the Free Speech Clause.  
Accordingly, the Constitution is most skeptical of supposed state 
interests that seek to keep people in the dark for what the 
government believes to be their own good.”500
 
Stevens suggests that commercial speech bans intended to further substantial state 
interests such as curbing gambling or alcohol consumption are illegitimate; and that 
if the speech in question is factual commercial information, it “should be subjected 
to the same stringent review as any other content-based abridgment of protected 
speech.”501
In 44 Liqourmart decided the following term, Stevens, writing the Court’s 
principal opinion, continued to redirect the commercial speech doctrine back to the 
rationale of Virginia Pharmacy.  The format of Stevens’ opinion even departs from 
those dominated by Central Hudson analysis.  He begins by outlining the 
 
498 Id. at 494 (Stevens, J. concurring). 
 
499 Id. at 497 (Stevens, J. concurring). 
 
500 Id. at 497 (Stevens, J. concurring). 
 
501 Id. at 497 (Stevens, J. concurring). 
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importance of advertising in American cultural life beginning in the colonial era.502  
He then describes the development of the Court’s commercial speech doctrine, 
citing and quoting liberally from Virginia Pharmacy.   
As Costello points out, Stevens builds on Blackmun’s Virginia Pharmacy 
rationale and his Central Hudson concurrence.503  In particular, Stevens echoes 
Blackmun’s sentiment that commercial speech bans on truthful non-misleading 
speech “not only hinder consumer choice, but also impede debate over central 
issues of public policy.”504  They do so because they often “obscure an ‘underlying 
government policy’ that could be implemented without regulating speech.”505  
What Stevens suggests is that the speech ban hides the machinery of government 
from public view.  The policy, or government interest in, for example, dampening 
demand for liquor, remains unknown to the public because this information is 
shielded by the ban.  The public is therefore unable to participate in important 
policy decisions.  This strikes at the heart of self-governance theory.  Or, as 
Costello puts it, such bans “serve to impede the very speech that the First 
Amendment was designed to protect and promote:  the discussion and criticism of 
government policies.”506  In this way, Stevens not only returns to the rationale of 
 
502 517 U.S. 484,489 (1996) at 495. 
 
503 See Costello, supra note 492, at 742. 
 
504 517 U.S. 484,489 (1996) at 503 (citing Blackmun, J. concurring in Central Hudson at 575). 
 
505 Id. at 503 (quoting Central Hudson at 566 n.9). 
 
506 See Costello, supra note 492, at 742 (quoting from Amicus Brief of Associate of National 
Advertisers in Support of Petitioner, 44 Liqourmart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S.Ct. 1495 (1995) No. 
94-1140, Costello writes that “‘since, in politics, as in baseball, you can’t hit what you can’t see, [total 
bans on truthful speech] strike[] at the heart of a citizen’s right to know in its mostly deeply political 
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his commercial speech mentor Blackmun, but expands his thinking and shows how 
information such as liquor prices can implicate the political process.  Although 
Stevens scaled back his attack on Central Hudson in the next commercial speech 
case, Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, he applied a more rigorous version of the 
test, one strengthened by the rational of Virginia Pharmacy.   
Justice Thomas’ “radical concurrence”507 in 44 Liqourmart also urged a return 
to the Blackmun rationale.  He suggests abandoning the Central Hudson test 
altogether (which he applied in Coors) and applying the same level of judicial 
scrutiny and First Amendment protection to truthful commercial speech as that 
applied to political speech.  Such a strategy, according to Thomas, would  
adhere to the doctrine adopted in Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy and in 
Justice Blackmun’s Central Hudson concurrence, that all attempts 
to dissuade legal choices by citizens by keeping them ignorant are 
impermissible.508   
 
Thomas notes that the Central Hudson test is difficult to apply with any degree of 
“uniformity” because of the “inherently nondeterminative nature of a case-by-case 
balancing ‘test.’”  Such a test leaves far too much to the preferences of individual 
judges and courts.  “Rather than continue to apply a test that makes no sense to me 
when the asserted state interest is of the type involved here,” Thomas writes, “I 
would return to the reasoning and holding of Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy.”509  Justice 
 
sense.’  By ‘regulating prices indirectly through censorship…legislators…avoid both a clear statement 
and an open debate on the issues’”). 
 
507 Id. at 717. 
 
508 517 U.S. 484,489 (1996) at 526 (Thomas, J. concurring). 
 
509 Id. at 528 (Thomas, J. concurring). 
  115
                                                                                                                                                
Thomas echoed these sentiments in his Greater New Orleans Broadcasting 
concurrence.510
The evolution of the commercial speech doctrine from Virginia Pharmacy to the 
present seems in some ways to have come full circle and to have been strengthened 
by the journey.  Behind the circuitous route, is the consistent voice of Justice 
Blackmun.  In the beginning, he spoke for the majority.  But with the advent of 
Central Hudson, he began to occupy the minority position from which he reminded 
his colleagues just how far they strayed from the commercial speech doctrine’s 
founding rationale.  But, as we have seen, in the years following his retirement in 
1994, the Blackmun rationale for protecting commercial speech has been taken up 
by other Justices on the Court.  As Ross wrote in 2001, “[i]n the past five years, the 
minority language of Justice Blackmun has come to dominate and direct 
commercial speech jurisprudence.”511
This return to the Blackmun rationale of Virginia Pharmacy has, as one critic 
put it, “reinvigorated” commercial speech protection.512  According to Langvardt, 
the 1990s “vice” cases signified “that the intermediate level of First Amendment 
protection for commercial speech indeed means and will continue to mean 
something substantial.”513  Others see the possibility that the Court could abandon 
 
 
510 527 U.S. 173 (1999) at 197. 
 
511 See Ross, supra note 6, at 746. 
 
512 See Langvardt, supra note 74, at 610. 
 
513 Id. at 640. 
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“intermediate scrutiny under the Central Hudson analysis” altogether in cases 
where the government attempts to regulate truthful, non-misleading commercial 
speech.514
If as Hoefges and Rivera-Sanchez suggest, truthful commercial speech after the 
1990s “vice” cases was elevated “to its highest level, approaching that of fully 
protected political and social speech,”515 then corporations such as Nike have 
nothing to fear unless their speech is false or misleading.  Nike’s aggressive 
attempts to protect its corporate statements by placing it under the rubric of political 
speech, suggests a thinly veiled attempt to immunize false and misleading speech 
by attaching it to an issue of public importance.516  Piety arrives at the same 
conclusion, stating that Nike’s attempts to get the Court to apply the Sullivan actual 
malice standard to its speech, “was asking for a constitutional right to lie.”517  This 
seems only necessary if Nike was indeed lying.  There is nothing in commercial 
speech jurisprudence that would protect false and misleading commercial speech.  
As Chemerinsky and Fisk point out: 
The commercial speech doctrine is premised on the Court’s 
longstanding belief that the truth about a company’s products and 
 
514 See Hoefges and Rivera-Sanchez, supra note 8, at 388-389 (writing that “four of the current 
justices—Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Thomas—have expressed their support for abandoning 
intermediate scrutiny under the Central Hudson analysis when government restricts truthful, non-
deceptive advertising in order to manipulate lawful consumer choices in the marketplace”). 
 
515 Id. at 349. 
 
516 In Bolger, the Court justified its exclusion of false commercial speech from full First Amendment 
protection by stating that companies already have “the full panoply of protection available.”  The Court 
was also fearful that companies might attempt to immunize “false or misleading product information 
from government regulation simply by including references to public issues” 463 U.S. 60 (1983) at 68. 
 
517 See Piety, supra note 290, at 153. 
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facilities will not emerge if the seller can lie about it.  Consumers 
do not have access to the seller’s facility and do not have the time 
to investigate the truth of the dozens or hundreds of claims they 
read or hear about products every day.518
 
Indeed, this is the one area of the commercial speech doctrine where the court has 
been consistent. 
In his Coors concurrence, Justice Stevens followed Blackmun’s assertion that 
the state should ensure “that the stream of commercial information flows cleanly as 
well as freely.”519  Stevens said false commercial speech “lacks the value that 
sometimes inheres in false or misleading political speech.”520  Not only does it lack 
value, but “the consequences of false commercial speech can be particularly severe:  
Investors may lose their savings, and consumers may purchase products that are 
more dangerous than they believe or that do not work as advertised.”521  Stevens 
continues: 
The evils of false commercial speech, which may have an 
immediate harmful impact on commercial transactions, together 
with the ability of purveyors of commercial speech to control 
falsehoods, explain why we tolerate more government regulation 
of this speech than of most other speech.522
 
This suggests that corporations such as Nike can and should make sure that the 
factual statements it makes about its own products and business practices, whether 
 
518 See Chemerinsky and Fisk, supra note 25, at 1152-1153. 
 
519 425 U.S. 748 (1976) at 772. 
 
520 514 U.S. 476 (1995) at 496 (Stevens, J. concurring). 
 
521 Id. at 496 (Stevens, J. concurring). 
 
522 Id. at 496 (Stevens, J. concurring). 
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in an editorial directly responding to critics or in an advertisement, are truthful.  
After all, as Blackmun writes in Virginia Pharmacy, corporate information is “more 
easily verifiable by its disseminator than” other types of protected speech.523   
In deciding Kasky v. Nike, the California Supreme Court did nothing less than 
attempt to ensure the clean flow of commercial speech.  In doing so, it left ample 
room for corporations to speak on public issues.  The majority made clear that not 
all corporate statements could be classified as factual assertions; that corporations 
were perfectly within their rights to issue opinions on matters of public importance.  
But when a corporation such as Nike “makes factual representations about its own 
products or its own operations, it must speak truthfully.”524  After all, the Court 
reasoned echoing Blackmun in Virginia Pharmacy, the corporate speaker is in the 
best “position to readily verify the truth of any factual assertions made.”525   
The difference between a factual statement and an opinion can simply be 
expressed as follows.  Nike is free to say “globalization is good.”  This is an 
opinion, not a descriptive factual statement.  It is not true or false, but right or 
wrong depending on one’s point of view.  However, when Nike makes the 
statement “we pay our foreign workers a living wage” they venture into the arena of 
factual representation.  The truth or falsity of this claim is ascertainable:  find out 
what constitutes a living wage in that part of the world and compare it to Nike’s 
wages.  What the California Supreme Court said was that Nike was accountable for 
 
523 425 U.S. 748 (1976) at footnote 24. 
 
524 27 CAL. 4th 939 (2002) at 946. 
 
525 Id. at 965-966. 
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such statements.  This, I argue, is perfectly in line with the Supreme Court’s modern 
commercial speech doctrine.   
Unfortunately, this does not entirely solve the central issue presented by a case 
such as Nike v. Kasky, namely, the definition of commercial speech.  However, if, 
in the spirit of Blackmun, the Court adopts a strict scrutiny approach to regulations 
on truthful, non-misleading commercial speech, then only two questions remain.  
First, is the speech commercial?  Second, is it truthful?  To answer the first 
question, I suggest adopting the California Supreme Court’s limited purpose test.  
Recall that the test was designed only for cases that examine regulations intended to 
ensure a fair bargaining process .526  Under these circumstances, and given the 
particular “evils” of false commercial speech, the test seems appropriate.  Once the 
speech has been classified as commercial, it may then be necessary, especially in 
mixed speech cases, to separate the facts from the opinions.   
Critics of the test fear that it handicaps one side of a public debate527 and 
potentially chills important corporate speech.528  Some fear that the test is too 
broad; that it tends to “label as commercial any speech made by a corporate 
actor.”529  These critics talk as if corporate communication is a fragile flower, easily 
destroyed by the frost of regulation.  Yet, Blackmun assures us these fears are 
unfounded.  Corporate communication in any form is “durable” and “hardy.”  Since 
 
526 27 CAL. 4th 939 (2002) at 960. 
 
527 Id. at 970-971 (Chin, J. dissenting). 
 
528 Id. at 984 (Brown, J. dissenting). 
 
529 See Barney, supra note 349, at 22. 
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such communication “is the sine qua non of commercial profits,” Blackmun writes, 
“there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and foregone 
entirely.” 530  By following recent developments in the Supreme Court’s 
commercial speech doctrine, especially its return to the Blackmun rationale, the 
California Supreme Court properly handled the commercial speech problems 
presented by Kasky v. Nike. 
The democratic self-governance rationale of Sullivan has been influential in the 
evolution of the modern commercial speech doctrine.  The Court needs to continue 
to follow the direction it has taken in more recent decisions.  If it continues to do so, 
truthful, non-misleading commercial information will enjoy uninhibited entry into 
the public arena.  But the Court must also continue to ensure that this information 
flows cleanly.  Returning to the rationale of Virginia Pharmacy is a step in the right 
direction. 
 
530 425 U.S. 748 (1976) at footnote 24 (writing that “[a]ttributes such as these, the greater objectivity 
and hardiness of commercial speech, may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for 
fear of silencing the speaker.  They may also make it appropriate to require that a commercial message 
appear in such a form, or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers as are 
necessary to prevent its being deceptive”). 
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     CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The predominant rationale of Sullivan, that speech on matters of public interest 
should enjoy free, uninhibited entry into the public arena, can be seen at work at 
key points in the development of the commercial speech doctrine.  Commercial 
speech was introduced under the aegis of the First Amendment because the Court 
concluded that the free flow of truthful commercial information was vital to the 
decision-making public and therefore warranted First Amendment protection.  
Although the Court strayed from this rationale when it introduced the Central 
Hudson balancing test, it returned to it in the 1990s when it strengthened First 
Amendment protection for commercial speech. 
The story, however, does not end here.  The Court has some way to go before 
all is well with the doctrine.  As Nike v. Kasky evinces, the Court will eventually 
wrestle with the tough problems presented by the growing sophistication of public 
relations campaigns.  Yet, the Court could go some way toward shoring up these 
potential problems by consistently applying the founding rationale of the 
commercial speech doctrine—the belief that truthful commercial speech is a social 
good.  
As we have seen, in the early commercial speech cases, it is not the speaker’s 
interests that are being protected; rather commercial speech is protected because it 
serves a social utility.  But as Justice Blackmun recognized in Virginia Pharmacy, 
this interest is not served by false or misleading commercial speech.  This point 
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seems to have been lost on those who insist that commercial speech receive the 
same level of protection as political speech or those who championed the free 
speech rights of Nike.  Take, for example, Justice Chin’s remarks in Kasky v. Nike 
in which he said Nike provided “relevant information” that “gave the public insight 
and perspective into the debate.”531  From Virginia Pharmacy through Central 
Hudson to the 1990s “vice” cases, the Supreme Court has maintained that the 
relevance of commercial information depends entirely on its truthfulness.  For this 
reason and because Nike v. Kasky settled out of court before it reached the 
discovery phase, no one is in a position to assess the relevance of Nike’s speech.   
However, Justice Chin is right to recognize that commercial speech is protected 
for reasons that serve the community.  In the early commercial speech cases, 
Blackmun highlighted the informational value of truthful commercial speech.  In 
Bigelow he said such speech is valuable if it contributes to a “‘free and general 
discussion of public matters.’”532  In Virginia Pharmacy, Blackmun emphasized the 
listener’s interest in truthful commercial speech.533  For Blackmun, the free flow of 
truthful commercial speech served the social interests in a better informed citizenry. 
The belief that accurate commercial information serves the social good has led 
to significant protection for commercial speech.  But the equally valid belief that 
inaccurate or false commercial speech is an “evil” that can have devastating 
consequences for society, is the reason it does not receive the same level of 
protection afforded political speech.  In addition, it seems consistent with the 
 
531 27 CAL. 4th 939 (2002) at 976-977 (Chin, J. dissenting). 
532 421 U.S. 809 (1975) at 829 (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,150 (1967)). 
533 425 U.S. 748 (1976) at 756. 
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rationale of Sullivan that only certain types of speech (i.e. core political speech) 
should enjoy free, uninhibited entry into the arena of public debate. 
The Court recognized early on that commercial speech is not the same fragile 
flower, easily chilled by the frost of regulation or potential litigation, as most types 
of political speech.  Those engaged in pure, not for profit, political speech for the 
most part simply do not have the same resources that a large corporation such as 
Nike has at its disposal.  In contrast to the speakers in Sullivan, corporations such as 
Nike have the financial incentive, power and money to ensure that its voice is 
heard.  For this reason, the success or failure of the Court in its future commercial 
speech cases may depend entirely on its adherence to some form of the Blackmun 
rationale that recognizes this power imbalance. 
The Court may be some ways from satisfactorily solving the problems presented 
by the modern commercial speech doctrine.  But returning to the self-governance 
rationale of Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy will continue to provide commercial 
speech with significant protection while at the same time ensuring that commercial 
information flows cleanly as well as freely. 
